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WHEN INTERNATIONAL LAW WAS A 
DOMESTIC PROBLEM 
Paul Finkelman∗ 
This Article will focus on two interrelated aspects of human rights 
law in the domestic context.  First, I briefly examine the use of foreign 
law by the United States in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.  This 
history shows that in America’s first century there was a substantial 
amount of borrowing of law from Europe, and that this foreign law 
shaped, sometimes dramatically, the development of American law.1  
Not all of this borrowing had to do with what we might identify as 
"human rights" in the twenty-first century, but, much of it did.  
Sometimes this foreign law was used to expand human rights; and at 
other times it might be seen as "anti-human rights" in the sense that it 
was used to suppress what the modern world would identify as human 
rights.  But, whether supportive of human rights or harmful to it, this 
history shows that the United States has a long tradition of applying 
foreign law involving human rights to our domestic law. 
My second focus is on the fact that the American states treated each 
other as “foreign entities” from the founding of the country until the 
beginning of the Civil War.  This practice was a function of the federal 
republic model, which loosely defined concepts of state sovereignty and 
state independence.  At the same time, states also treated the national 
government as a foreign power.  In its most extreme form, this notion of 
state sovereignty would lead to secession and civil war. 
When American states faced issues of slavery and freedom, the 
states often refused to recognize and give comity to the laws of other 
states.  Thus, from 1787 to at least 1865, notions of international human 
rights law in the domestic context usually involved interstate relations, 
rather than relations between the United States and foreign nations.  The 
most significant aspect of this domestic use of international law concepts 
involved slavery and race. 
One example of this interstate conflict over human rights law, which 
I will discuss at some length below, involved the status of free black 
sailors who entered Southern ports.  Starting in 1822, South Carolina 
refused to recognize the free status of black sailors serving on Northern 
                                                 
∗ President William McKinley Distinguished Professor of Law and Public Policy, 
Albany Law School. 
1 For a much more elaborate discussion of the use of foreign law by American courts, 
see Paul Finkelman, Foreign Law and American Constitutional Interpretation:  A Long and 
Venerable Tradition, 63 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 29 (2007). 
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and British ships when those ships docked in Charleston.2  Almost every 
other Southern coastal state followed South Carolina’s lead.  In the 1840s, 
Massachusetts sent commissioners to South Carolina and Louisiana to 
resolve disputes over this issue, but these efforts failed.  Then, in Dred 
Scott v. Sandford3 the Supreme Court held that blacks could never be 
citizens of the nation and had no rights under the Constitution, implying 
that Southern states had an absolute right to prohibit the entrance of free 
blacks from other states.4  The issue remained unresolved until the end 
of the Civil War and was finally settled with the ratification of the 
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, which recognized the rights of 
blacks as citizens of the United States and guaranteed their right to travel 
freely throughout the nation.5 
Another example of how the application of human rights law 
affected American domestic law concerns the status of slaves voluntarily 
brought by their masters into free states.  Before the 1840s almost all the 
states—North and South—recognized that freedom attached to slaves 
voluntarily taken into the North, although some northern states passed 
laws to modify this rule by granting southern masters a right of limited 
transit.  By the 1850s this had changed.  Most Southern states no longer 
accepted the idea that residence in a free state would emancipate a slave 
while most Northern states aggressively asserted the right to emancipate 
slaves who, with their masters’ permission or acquiescence, set foot on 
free soil.  Similar issues arose over the status of fugitive slaves and of 
northerners who helped fugitive slaves who had escaped to the North. 
I.  FEAR OF FOREIGN LAW 
This symposium focuses for the most part, on the problem of 
applying international human rights law to American domestic law.  
Most of us think of international law or human rights law in the 
domestic context as involving some other system of law being either 
borrowed or imposed by outsiders. 
                                                 
2 “AN ACT for the better regulation and government of Free Negroes and Persons of 
Color; and for other purposes,” 7 Stat. S.C. 461 (1822). 
3 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
4 This might still have left open the possibility that the southern states could not 
interfere with the free black citizens from Britain and other foreign states who came into 
their ports, but given the Court’s strong support of local police powers, in such cases as 
Miln v. Mayor of New York City, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102 (1837) and Cooley v. Bd. of Port Wardens 
of Philadelphia, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1852), it seems likely that the Court would have 
upheld the right of the slave states to prohibit foreign blacks from entering their ports.  
5  In Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867) the Supreme Court settled this issue 
six months before the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment.  The modern court 
reaffirmed this right under the Fourteenth Amendment in Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999). 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 44, No. 3 [2010], Art. 2
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol44/iss3/2
2010] Domestic Problem 781 
For the paranoid, this idea conjures up notions of blue-helmeted 
foreigners occupying American territory, arresting our politicians for 
alleged misdeeds, and dragging them to The Hague, Geneva, or some 
other foreign place, to be tried and punished without a jury or a bill of 
rights to protect them.  In the mind of Justices Antonin Scalia or Clarence 
Thomas, this idea conjures up a world in which the Supreme Court 
overturns state or federal law on the basis of “foreign moods, fads, or 
fashions.”6 
For the hopeful, this idea might mean that the United States signs-on 
to various human rights conventions and treaties, and actually 
implements them.7  This might be in part an extension of existing federal 
law, such as the Alien Tort Claims Act,8 which allows non-Americans to 
gain substantial private justice in our courts for wrongs committed 
overseas.  Oddly, despite the fear of “foreign law” by some people 
(especially those such as Justices Thomas and Scalia, who glory in the 
intent of the framers), the Alien Tort Claims Act has been with us since 
the adoption of the Judiciary Act of 1789.9  Thus, in one sense, it seems 
clear that the members of the First Congress, who also wrote and passed 
the Bill of Rights, believed in the implementation of international human 
rights law in the United States courts.  Another notion of human rights 
law might be that U.S. law simply allows claims to be brought in our 
courts under international concepts of human rights as well as U.S. 
statutes.  Alternatively, acknowledging international human rights might 
be as simple as the Court accepting, as Justice Anthony M. Kennedy did 
in Roper v. Simmons, that “[i]t is proper that we acknowledge the 
overwhelming weight of international opinion against the juvenile death 
penalty.”10  Roper overturned a death penalty for someone who 
committed a capital offense when he was a minor.  Justice Kennedy’s 
majority opinion cited an amicus brief from the Human Rights 
Committee of the Bar of England and Wales.  Relying on this brief, and 
                                                 
6 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 598 (2003) (Scalia, J. dissenting) (quoting Foster v. 
Florida, 537 U.S. 990 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring)).  See also Finkelman, Foreign Law and 
American Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 1 (discussing this in larger detail). 
7 Although it had a leading role in promulgating the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, in years since that time the United States has signed but not ratified, or signed and 
ratified with reservations, declarations, or understandings to which other states object, 
various international treaties concerning human rights.  See Racism, Human Rights & 
Worldwide Issues, http://academic.udayton.edu/race/06hrights/unitednations/US 
Status.htm (summarizing the status of U.S. action with respect to key international treaties); 
see generally Joe Stork, Human Rights and U.S. Policy, http://www.fpif.org/reports/ 
human_rights_and_us_policy. 
8 Judiciary Act, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 (1789) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006)).   
9 Judiciary Act, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 (1789). 
10 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005). 
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other arguments, Kennedy noted “[t]he opinion of the world 
community, while not controlling our outcome, does provide respected 
and significant confirmation for our own conclusions.”11 
II.  FOREIGN LAW IN EARLY AMERICAN LAW 
Foreign law has been part of our jurisprudence since our first courts 
met.  Nineteenth century jurists cited foreign courts, continental legal 
theorists, and even Roman law.  American courts often followed new 
legal ideas coming from outside the United States.  For example, the 
“fellow servant rule” in labor law began in Britain,12 but American courts 
quickly adopted it.  Under this rule, courts held that large employers, 
such as railroads and factories, were not liable to their employees for 
work-place accidents caused by other employees’ negligence.  Rather, 
the injured worker had to sue his negligent “fellow servant,” who in 
most cases would be judgment proof.  This rule had the effect of shifting 
one cost of industrialization—the care of injured workers—from 
investors and capitalists to the workers themselves and their families.  By 
the end of the nineteenth century, almost every state adopted this rule, 
which began in Great Britain in the 1830s.13 
In the 1820s the Supreme Court turned to foreign law to justify the 
taking of Indian land.  In Johnson v. M’Intosh,14 Chief Justice John 
Marshall, speaking for a unanimous Court, turned to European notions 
of conquest, land use, and property ownership when considering the 
nature of Indian land ownership.  The Court used these foreign law 
concepts to proclaim that Indians, neither as individuals nor as nations, 
had any permanent title to their land.  Counsel in the case cited a 
plethora of foreign law sources,15 including the works of Emmerich de 
                                                 
11 Id. 
12 Priestly v. Fowler, (1837) 150 Eng. Rep. 1030.  South Carolina accepted the doctrine in 
Murray v. S.C. R.R. Co., 26 S.C.L. (1 McMul.) 385 (1841).  More importantly, the great 
Massachusetts Chief Justice, Lemuel Shaw, adopted the rule in Farwell v. Boston & Worcester 
R.R. Corp., 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 49 (1842).  For a discussion of the early American application 
of this case see LEONARD W. LEVY, THE LAW OF THE COMMONWEALTH AND CHIEF JUSTICE 
SHAW 166–82 (1957). 
13 Jerrilyn G. Marston, Comment, The Creation of a Common Law Rule:  The Fellow Servant 
Rule, 1837–1860, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 579, 579 (1984) (“By 1880 the [fellow servant] rule . . . was 
 . . . firmly entrenched in nearly every American jurisdiction . . . .).  Southern courts did not 
generally apply this rule to slave workers rented by railroads, steamboats, and other 
industries.  See Paul Finkelman, Slaves as Fellow Servants:  Ideology, Law, and Industrialization, 
31 AM. J. LEGAL. HIST. 269, 281–304 (1987). 
14 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).  See generally LINDSAY G. ROBERTSON, CONQUEST BY LAW:  
HOW THE DISCOVERY OF AMERICA DISPOSSESSED INDIGENOUS PEOPLES OF THEIR LANDS 
(2005). 
15 See Briefs for Defendants, Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 569–70 (1823). 
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Vattel, Baron Samuel von Puffendorf, Hugo Grotius, John Locke, and 
Baron Montesquieu.16  The theories of the foreign scholars helped bolster 
the result in the case.  In his opinion, Marshall embraced the doctrine of 
discovery,17 which derived from European law.  This doctrine allowed 
the United States to take land from the Indians at will.  Marshall asserted 
throughout the opinion that all European nations accepted the doctrine 
of discovery,18 and that Americans inherited and adopted the doctrine.  
The Chief Justice endorsed “the theory of the British constitution, [that] 
all vacant lands are vested in the crown, as representing the nation; and 
the exclusive power to grant them is admitted to reside in the crown, as a 
branch of the royal prerogative.”19  Marshall acknowledged that “this 
principle was as fully recognized in America as in the Island of Great 
Britain.”20  This doctrine, being entirely based on foreign law, became 
fundamental to American land law.21  Marshall asserted that the United 
States might take land by treaty or purchase, but would only do so to 
avoid conflict and accomplish the land grab smoothly.  Using foreign 
law, Marshall justified the United States taking the land in any way it 
chose. 
This case can be seen as the opposite of imposing international 
human rights law on the United States.  It can be seen as an “anti-human 
rights” result; however, the issue here is not the outcome of the case nor 
its relationship to human rights per se, but rather to underscore that early 
in our history the courts and the legislatures accepted international law 
concepts which then could be applied to human rights domestically. 
Indeed, in our nation’s first century, foreign law was prominent in 
American cases.  Database searches of United States Supreme Court 
opinions reveal that the Court cited foreign legal sources extensively.22  
                                                 
16 His full name was Charles-Louis de Secondat, baron de La Brède et de Montesquieu. 
17 See M’Intosh, 21 U.S. at 572. 
18 Id. at 572–79. 
19 Id. at 595. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. at 592 (“[T]he principle . . . supposed to be recognized by all European 
governments, from the first settlement of America.  The absolute ultimate title has been 
considered as acquired by discovery, subject only to the Indian title of occupancy, which 
title the discoverers possessed the exclusive right of acquiring.”). 
22 The material in this section is based on searches conducted in Lexis and Westlaw 
databases.  These searches probably undercount the use of foreign law because search 
results will not include spelling variations of proper names or descriptive references to not-
named authors.  For example, my search by proper name for “Vattel,” the great Swiss legal 
scholar, did not return results to “Vatel,” general references to his book, The Law of Nations, 
or a reference describing Vattel not by name but as “a great European expert on the law of 
nations.” 
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The U.S. Supreme Court cited English law about 750 times before 1865.  
The Court cited Lord Chief Justice Mansfield about 170 times, the Court 
of King’s Bench about 125 times, Sir Edward Coke about 100 times, the 
German legal scholar Baron Samuel von Puffendorf more than 12 times, 
the Dutch scholar Hugo Grotius about 50 times, and the Dutch scholar 
Ulrich Huber and the French philosopher Montesquieu at least 10 times 
each.  The great Swiss legal scholar Emmerich de Vattel was a central 
figure for American jurisprudence, because he wrote extensively on 
federalism in his treatise, Law of Nations.23  This book was “[t]ranslated 
immediately into English” and “was unrivaled among such treatises in 
its influence on the American founders.”24  Before 1865, the Court cited 
him at least thirty times while attorneys cited him in their arguments 
about seventy times.  From 1865 to 1910, the Court cited Vattel thirty-
three more times, while lawyers cited him in nearly thirty other cases.25 
Sometimes the early Court cited many foreign sources in the same 
case.  Consider Brown v. United States,26 a case involving the embargo 
during the War of 1812 and the seizure of goods aboard a ship.  Here, 
Chief Justice Marshall cited the French theorist Montesquieu, the Dutch 
legal scholar Cornelius van Bynkershoek, the Swiss legal scholar 
Emmerich de Vattel, and the English scholar Joseph D. Chitty.27  In his 
dissent, Justice Joseph Story cited a long list of English cases, as well as 
the German legal scholar Puffendorf, Vattel, Grotius, Bynkershoek, Lord 
Chief Justice Mansfield, and other foreign sources.28 
During the Civil War, in The Prize Cases,29 the Court considered the 
legality of Lincoln’s blockade of Confederate ports.  In this uniquely 
American case, the Court relied heavily on foreign law.  In arguing for 
the United States, Richard Henry Dana, Jr. cited a number of British 
cases as well as works by Grotius and other international law theorists.30  
In his opinion upholding President Lincoln’s power to impose a 
                                                 
23 See MONSIEUR DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS; OR, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF 
NATURE, APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND OF SOVEREIGNS (Joseph 
Chitty ed. & trans., 1852) (1785). 
24 PETER ONUF & NICHOLAS ONUF, FEDERAL UNION, MODERN WORLD:  THE LAW OF 
NATIONS IN AN AGE OF REVOLUTIONS 1776–1814, at 11 (1993). 
25 See supra note 22.  Statistics are based on Westlaw and Lexis databases queries.  
Regarding U.S. Reports, searches seriously undercount the use of foreign sources in legal 
arguments and briefs first because most briefs and arguments were not published in U.S. 
Reports, but also because, as noted supra, search results will not include cases where the 
Court cited a book’s title, but not its author, or incorrectly spelled the author’s name. 
26 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110 (1814). 
27 Id. at 124–25. 
28 Id. at 129–50 (Story J., dissenting). 
29 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863). 
30 Brief for Libellants at 650, 654, The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1862). 
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blockade, and thus enabling the President to prosecute the war effort, 
Justice Robert Grier quoted Vattel:  “it is very evident that the common 
laws of war—those maxims of humanity, moderation, and honor—ought 
to be observed by both parties in every civil war.”31  He also cited Lord 
Stowell of the British High Court of Admiralty,32 a proclamation by 
Queen Victoria of England,33 and the “law of nations” as a general body 
of law.34 
After the Civil War, the Court considered the use of military courts 
to try civilians when the civilian courts were open and functioning.  In 
the aftermath of the War, lawyers and judges turned to foreign law to 
help determine whether the United States could try civilians by military 
tribunals or military commissions.  In Ex parte Milligan,35 a case that has 
implications for the United States in the modern War on Terror36 as well 
as modern human rights law, lawyers for Milligan relied heavily on 
foreign law and what would have been a version of “human rights law” 
at the time.  The burden of Milligan’s case was to show, in effect, that it 
violated fundamental notions of justice—which would of course include 
fundamental human rights—to try a civilian by a military court if there 
was a civil alternative available.  One of Milligan’s lawyers, the great 
David Dudley Field, cited English law, French law, and the writings and 
opinions of William Blackstone, Lord Hale, Sir James Mackintosh, 
Montesquieu, and the French scholar and student of American society, 
Alexis de Tocqueville.  All of these citations supported the principle that 
the military could not try civilians,37 and that to do so would threaten 
fundamental human rights.  This is a powerful example of the 
application of foreign notions of fundamental rights—the right to a fair 
trial by an impartial forum—in American law. 
Stressing the importance of foreign law to the United States, one of 
Milligan’s other attorneys, Jeremiah S. Black (a former U.S. Attorney 
General), declared “England owes more of her freedom, her grandeur, 
and her prosperity to [the jury trial], than to all other causes put 
                                                 
31 The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) at 667. 
32 Id. at 668. 
33 Id. at 669. 
34 Id. at 670. 
35 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866). 
36 See, e.g., Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213 (4th Cir. 2008) (en banc, per curiam), 
vacated, remanded, application [for transfer from military to civilian custody] granted by Al-
Marri v. Spagone, 129 S. Ct. 1545 (U.S. 2009).  The Fourth Circuit opinion discussed at 
length “Milligan's teaching—that our Constitution does not permit the Government to 
subject civilians within the United States to military jurisdiction.”  Id. at 230. 
37 See Briefs for Petitioners at 31, 35–39, 47–49, 53–56, 65, Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 
Wall.) 2 (1866). 
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together.”38  Black noted that French scholars such as “Montesquieu and 
De Tocqueville speak of [the jury trial] with an admiration as rapturous 
as Coke and Blackstone.”39  Citing recent European history, he noted 
that: 
the most enlightened states of continental Europe have 
transplanted it into their countries . . . . It was only in 
1830 that an interference with it in Belgium provoked a 
successful insurrection which permanently divided one 
kingdom into two.  In the same year, the Revolution of 
the Barricades gave the right of trial by jury to every 
Frenchman.40 
Here was a former attorney general arguing that the United States 
Supreme Court should take note of, and follow, European notions of due 
process and the fair administration of justice. 
In his opinion for the Court, Justice David Davis similarly cited old 
English law, the theories of Lord Brougham and Sir James Mackintosh, 
and a famous nineteenth century English case involving the military 
court trial of a civilian in the colony of Demerara.41  Justice Davis noted 
that Brougham and Mackintosh had “participated in that debate; and 
denounced the trial as illegal; because it did not appear that the courts of 
law in Demerara could not try offences, and that ‘when the laws can act, 
every other mode of punishing supposed crimes is itself an enormous 
crime.’”42  This was almost exactly the situation in Milligan’s case.  Thus, 
the Court found foreign precedent useful and directly on point for 
civilian trials after America’s Civil War.43  The Demerara case turned on 
the jurisdiction of courts in the British colonies, but the principle from 
that case, which Justice Davis accepted, was that a civilian trial was 
essential to the preservation of fundamental rights. 
III.  FOREIGN LAW IN OUR EARLY FEDERAL REPUBLIC 
The debate over international human rights law in the United States, 
as the previous section shows, should begin with the understanding that 
foreign law has always been part of American constitutional law.  But it 
                                                 
38 Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 65. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. at 128.  The Demerara case, The King v. Rev. John Smith, is discussed in PAUL 
FINKELMAN, SLAVERY IN THE COURTROOM 272–77 (1985). 
42 Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 128. 
43 Both cases are of course relevant to the United States in a post-9-11 World. 
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is also useful to understand that there was a time when “international 
law” was a part of American domestic law in a quite different and more 
powerful way.  Today, with fifty states, the District of Columbia, more 
than 500 Indian tribes government by tribal law, federal Indian law, or 
both, and Puerto Rico, the United States is a veritable United Nations of 
jurisdictions, which can be in conflict with each other in a variety of 
ways.  Many interstate legal issues today are covered by federal law, but 
there are still instances where the states can, or at least try to, treat each 
other as foreign nations. 44  While generally treating the laws of other 
states with respect, the American states have, sometimes, nevertheless 
interacted as though they were separate countries being asked to enforce 
the laws of foreign nations.45 
Under the pre-Civil War Constitution the states were more likely to 
act as independent republics or nations than they are today.  As such, 
they often related to each other exactly as foreign nations relate to each 
other today.  This context often forced the Supreme Court to use 
international law concepts to settle purely domestic issues between the 
states or citizens of the states.  These cases did not implicate federal 
plenary powers, which was the issue in Johnson v. M’Intosh and The Prize 
Cases. 
Sometimes these issues were relatively benign and had few 
consequences for the nature of the Union or human rights.  In Alabama v. 
                                                 
44 See for example the facts surrounding Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460 (2005).  In 
Granholm, plaintiffs challenged Michigan and New York laws that discriminated against 
out-of-state wineries in favor of in-state wineries.  Id. at 465−66.  The laws allowed in-state 
wineries to sell directly to consumers but prohibited out-of-state vendors from making 
direct sales.  Id. at 466.  The Court held that both state laws violated the Commerce Clause 
and the Twenty-first Amendment.  Id.  The Court affirmed the “mandate” that “[s]tates 
may not enact laws that burden out-of-state producers or shippers simply to give a 
competitive advantage to in-state businesses.”  Id. at 472.  The history of this maxim dates 
back to the Framers’ concern that states would not unify and would essentially “Balkanize” 
and operate as a group of separate nations.  Id.  The Court reviewed the historical need to 
prevent friction among the states: 
This mandate “reflect[s] a central concern of the Framers that was an 
immediate reason for calling the Constitutional Convention: the 
conviction that in order to succeed, the new Union would have to 
avoid the tendencies toward economic Balkanization that had plagued 
relations among the Colonies and later among the States under the 
Articles of Confederation.” 
Id. (citing Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325−26 (1979)).    
45 Issues surrounding same sex marriage are likely to be the next major example of this.  
The Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006), 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006), even if 
it is held to be constitutional, is unlikely to eliminate all interstate disputes over the status 
of spouses, children, property, taxation, rights of survivorship, and inheritance stemming 
from same-sex unions, same-sex marriages, and domestic partnerships. 
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Georgia,46 for example, decided on the eve of the Civil War, the Court 
determined the location of the boundary between those two states.  
Nothing, it would seem, could have been a more distinctly American 
legal question than the border of these two states along the 
Chattahoochee River.  Yet, in order to determine the boundary between 
these two states, Justice James Wayne (who was from Georgia) turned to 
Grotius, Vattel, and England’s Lord Hale.47  This was surely not the 
application of international human rights law to American law, but 
rather the application of more general aspects of international law.  
However, the general principle seems clear.  In the antebellum period, 
the Court had no problem using international law to solve what were 
purely domestic legal problems. 
This understanding of the common use of international law helps us 
better understand the role of international law, and human rights law, 
when applied to the great problems of slavery and race in antebellum 
America.  This problem arose out of interstate conflicts over the status of 
slaves, free blacks, and white opponents of slavery.  This was where 
America domestic law intersected with international law and with what 
today we could call international human rights law.  The antebellum 
system of American federalism deeply tied “domestic international law” 
to the problematic relationship between human rights and an expansion 
of liberty, in one state, and the denial of human rights, and protection of 
slavery, in another state. 
IV.  INTERSTATE CONFLICTS, THEORY, AND RACE IN ANTEBELLUM AMERICA 
Antebellum American jurists generally turned to Joseph Story, and 
to a lesser extent, James Kent, when confronted with a domestic conflict-
of-laws issue.  In his Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws, Story declared 
that conflicts issues should be decided by the application of three 
interrelated axioms that Story extrapolated from the work of the 
seventeenth-century Dutch legal theorist, Ulrich Huber.48  The first 
                                                 
46 64 U.S. (23 How.) 505 (1859). 
47 Id. at 513. 
48 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, 30 (1834) [hereinafter 
STORY, CONFLICT].  Alan Watson has argued that Story actually misread and/or 
misunderstood Huber.  ALAN WATSON, JOSEPH STORY AND THE COMITY OF ERRORS:  A CASE 
STUDY IN CONFLICT OF LAWS 18–21 (1992).  This is likely for two reasons.  First, although an 
accomplished scholar, Story may have very well misunderstood or mistranslated Huber, 
who wrote in Latin and Dutch.  More importantly, much of Story’s scholarship, especially 
his work on conflicts and his Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States (1833) was 
consciously designed to further his lifelong goal of nationalizing all law in the United 
States.  On Story’s nationalizing interests, see generally R. KENT NEWMYER, SUPREME COURT 
JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY:  STATESMAN OF THE OLD REPUBLIC (1985); Paul Finkelman, Story 
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axiom declared the laws of any nation were enforceable “only within the 
limits of its own government” and had no binding force “beyond those 
limits.”49  Second, Story asserted that “all persons, who are found within 
the limits of government, whether their residence is permanent or 
temporary, are to be deemed subjects thereof.”50  The third axiom was 
the most difficult to apply.  It held that all rules “from comity admit, that 
the laws of every people in force within its own limits, ought to have the 
same force every where, so far as they do not prejudice the power or 
rights of other governments, or of their citizens.”51 
The critical question was how to determine these limits, especially 
for the separate jurisdictions that made up the United States in the 
antebellum period.  What were the elements of a law or judicial opinion 
that made it “prejudice” another jurisdiction?  There was no set answer 
for this question.  How a court responded to such an argument 
depended on the philosophical foundations of the political entity, as well 
as the ideological assumptions of the judges.  Not surprisingly, in the 
antebellum era, attitudes towards race and slavery could put the 
jurisprudence or laws of one state beyond the pale of acceptability in 
another.  The most crucial tests of these theories involved slavery and 
race. 
Story wrote in the wake of the Missouri Crisis and at the very 
moment that the abolitionist movement was growing in his home state of 
Massachusetts.  Slavery was fast becoming the central issue of the era.   
Furthermore, new technologies, particularly the steamboat and the 
railroad, made the states of the nation seem physically closer because of 
easier accessibility, just as northern opposition to slavery and southern 
insistence on the positive good of slavery drove a wedge between them. 
How should the free states treat slaves who entered their 
jurisdictions accompanying their masters on visits or sojourns?  How 
should the slave states treat slaves who lived or worked in the North, 
and under northern law gained their liberty?  How should the slave 
states treat northern or foreign free blacks who entered their 
jurisdictions?  The place of comity in domestic international law was 
about to move from an abstract theoretical issue to a concrete problem, 
                                                                                                             
Telling on the Supreme Court:  Prigg v. Pennsylvania and Justice Joseph Story’s Judicial 
Nationalism, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 247; Paul Finkelman, Prigg v. Pennsylvania:  Understanding 
Justice Story’s Pro-Slavery Nationalism, 2 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 51 (1997).  Thus, his version of 
Huber may have been a conscious effort to nationalize American law, with the Supreme 
Court at the center of all legal controversies. 
49 STORY, CONFLICT, supra note 48, at 30. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. at 29. 
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made more complicated by the highly charged emotional issues 
surrounding slavery, freedom, and race. 
Story understood what was at stake, as he went on to argue52 that the 
obligation of comity is an “imperfect obligation, like that of beneficence, 
humanity, and charity.”53  Thus, Story found that “[e]very nation must 
be the final judge for itself, not only of the nature and extent of the duty, 
but of the occasions, on which its exercise may be justly demanded.”54  
Among those circumstances where comity would not be required, were 
when foreign “laws are deemed oppressive or injurious to the rights or 
interests of the inhabitants of the latter, or where the moral character is 
questionable, or their provisions impolitic.”55  Story believed that “a 
nation ought not to make its own jurisprudence an instrument of 
injustice for other nations, or their subjects”56 but the test of injustice 
would always be in the courts of the forum state.  Indeed, in the end 
“every nation must judge for itself”57 when to grant comity. 
Story’s position mirrored that of the nation’s other great legal 
theorist and treatise writer, Chancellor James Kent of New York.  In his 
Commentaries on American Law, Kent asserted that the “laws and usages 
of one state cannot be permitted to prescribe qualifications for citizens, to 
be claimed and exercised in other states, in contravention to their local 
policy.”58  A concrete example of this assertion helps explain its meaning.  
Under Kent’s theory, a Virginia slave owner could not claim a right to 
own a slave in New York by arguing that he had that right under 
Virginia law, and that New York had an obligation to extend comity to 
Virginia law, and recognize his ownership in a slave.  Virginia slave law, 
in other words, could not be imposed on New York, “in contravention” 
of its “local policy.”  Similarly, a free black from New York who could 
move about that state without any legal impediments, could not claim 
such rights in Virginia.59 
Before the Civil War, the slavery controversy could turn in two 
directions.  A free state might declare that it immediately emancipated 
                                                 
52 WATSON, supra note 48, at 20–22.  Here, Watson argues that Story departs significantly 
from Huber’s thesis.  Id. 
53 STORY, CONFLICT, supra note 48, at 33. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. at 34. 
57 Id. 
58 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 62 (1827). 
59 Free blacks from Northern states might have claimed that under the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause of the Constitution (U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1) they had a right to 
travel to other states, but the southern states simply refused to acknowledge that free 
blacks could be citizens of the states, and thus have rights  under this clause.  Chief Justice 
Taney upheld that position in Dred Scott v. Sandford. 
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slaves voluntarily brought into its jurisdiction; a slave state might claim 
the right to incarcerate a visiting free black or to re-enslave a black who 
gained liberty though sojourn or transit in a free state. 
V.  SLAVERY, RACE, AND DOMESTIC CONFLICTS OF LAW: 
SLAVES IN FREE STATES 
The most complex and important issue of antebellum America was 
slavery.  It was, as some scholars have called it, the “Nemesis of the 
Constitution.”60  Much of antebellum constitutional decision-making 
turned on judges’ feelings about slavery.  Even in cases that did not 
directly concern slavery, such as The Passenger Cases61 or Mayor of New 
York v. Miln,62 slavery lurked in the background, affecting the analysis 
and decisions of the Justices. 63 
The domestic application of human rights principles and 
international law to the problem of slavery arose whenever a case 
involved a slave who was in a “foreign” jurisdiction.  “Foreign,” in this 
case, meant a state other than the slave’s, or the master’s, home state.  
“Foreign” could also apply if a slave returned to his or her home state, 
after being taken to a free state or country.  In such cases, race and 
concepts of human rights became a significant factor in the development 
of American law.  As slavery ended in most of the western hemisphere, 
the South’s “peculiar institution” became increasingly “peculiar” and 
increasingly problematic for lawyers.  Meanwhile, American law became 
increasingly disconnected from international notions of human rights.  
By 1850, slavery had been abolished everywhere in the Western 
Hemisphere  except Cuba, Puerto Rico, Brazil, and the United States.  Yet, 
in 1857 Chief Justice Taney held in Dred Scott v. Sandford that slavery was 
a protected form of property and that blacks, even if free, could never be 
citizens.  Clearly, there was a disconnect between the international 
community and the United States. 
A. Fugitive Slave Cases 
These issues arose in cases involving fugitive slaves.  The 
Constitution prevented the free states from emancipating fugitive slaves 
and guaranteed that masters could recover their escaped slaves in other 
                                                 
60 HAROLD M. HYMAN & WILLIAM M. WIECEK, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW:  
CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT, 1835–1875, at 86 (1982). 
61 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849). 
62 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102 (1837). 
63 See Paul Finkelman, Teaching Slavery in American Constitutional Law, 34 AKRON L. REV. 
261 (2000). 
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states.64  In this context the U.S. Constitution might be seen as “anti-
human rights.”  In fact, some abolitionists saw it that way, with William 
Lloyd Garrison calling the document “A Covenant with Death and an 
Agreement in Hell.” 
Whenever a person claimed a black as a fugitive slave, questions of 
identification could easily cloud the implementation of this clause.  In an 
age before photographs, fingerprinting, and DNA, the wrong person 
might easily be seized and enslaved.  Thus, throughout the North there 
were legitimate fears that free blacks might be kidnapped or illegally 
claimed as fugitive slaves. 
But, even if identification had been perfect, questions of the actual 
legal status of an alleged fugitive slave might arise.  In 1797, for example, 
four blacks living in Pennsylvania petitioned Congress, which was 
meeting in Philadelphia at the time, to protect their freedom.  They 
claimed their North Carolina masters manumitted them and that the 
Superior Court of North Carolina confirmed their freedom.  However, a 
state statute threatened their liberty by retroactively65 voiding all 
manumissions, except for “meritorious service.”66  Were these blacks 
slaves who owed service or labor in North Carolina?  Or, were they free 
people in danger of being kidnapped by greedy heirs or creditors of their 
former masters?  The situation of these blacks illustrates the complexity 
of determining who might be a fugitive slave. 
The two most significant fugitive slave cases to reach the U.S. 
Supreme Court—Prigg v. Pennsylvania67 and Jones v. Van Zandt68—
involved issues of status, identity, and race.  These cases illustrated how 
race and human rights claims became a central issue in determining 
whether the law of the free states or that of the slave states would set the 
standard in American jurisprudence.  Significantly, in both cases the 
Supreme Court adopted a jurisprudence which simply assumed that 
blackness was equivalent to slavery.  A brief examination of the cases 
illustrates this. 
                                                 
64 U.S. CONST., art. IV, § 2, cl. 3. 
65 The U.S. Constitution prohibits the states from passing “ex post facto law.”  U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 10.  But the ban on ex post facto laws narrowly applied to criminal matters.  
A statute declaring manumissions to be void would not be a criminal law, and thus would 
not be prohibited by the ban on ex post facto laws. 
66 DONALD F. ROBINSON, SLAVERY IN THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN POLITICS, 1765-1820 
288–89 (1971). 
67 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842).  On the history of this case, see Finkelman, Story Telling on 
the Supreme Court, supra note 48; Paul Finkelman, Sorting Out Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 24 
RUTGERS L.J. 605 (1993); Paul Finkelman, Prigg v. Pennsylvania and Northern State Courts:  
Anti-Slavery Use of a Pro-Slavery Decision, 25 CIV. WAR HIST. 5 (1979). 
68 46 U.S. (5 How.) 215 (1847). 
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Prigg began when Nathan S. Bemis, Edward Prigg, and two other 
Marylanders seized a black woman, Margaret Morgan, and her children, 
and took them from York County, Pennsylvania to Harford County, 
Maryland as fugitive slaves.69  Bemis’s mother-in-law claimed that 
Morgan was her slave and that she escaped to Pennsylvania.  Prigg et al. 
took Morgan and her children to Maryland without first obtaining a 
certificate of removal from a Pennsylvania judge, as required by 
Pennsylvania’s personal liberty law of 1826.70 
The Marylanders initially tried to comply with the Pennsylvania law.  
Before seizing Morgan they went to a local justice of the peace, Thomas 
Henderson, and obtained a warrant, as required by the Pennsylvania law 
of 1826.  A local constable then accompanied the four Marylanders to the 
Morgan home, arrested the family, and brought them back to Justice of 
the Peace Henderson.  Henderson, however, refused to grant a certificate 
of removal to take the Morgans back to Maryland.  Jerry Morgan, 
Margaret’s husband, was clearly a freeborn native of Pennsylvania, and 
Margaret gave birth to one or more of her children in that free state as 
well, and under Pennsylvania law, the children were also free.71  
Furthermore, Margaret Morgan had never been claimed as a slave in 
Maryland, nor treated like one.  Indeed, the 1830 census, taken while the 
Morgans were still present in Maryland, listed Margaret and her children 
as free blacks.72  Significantly, the county sheriff gathered this census 
data.  Although we cannot be certain, Morgan probably explained the 
circumstances of her life to Henderson, who then released the Morgans 
from custody. 
Bemis, Prigg, and the other two men then seized Margaret Morgan 
and her children (but not her free-born husband), and took them to 
Maryland, where eventually they were sold to a slave trader and 
removed from the state.  York County indicted all four men for 
kidnapping, and the governor of Pennsylvania sought their extradition.  
Initially, Maryland’s governor stonewalled on returning any of the 
                                                 
69 See Finkelman, Story Telling on the Supreme Court, supra note 48, at 252. 
70 Prigg, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 550–56.  The personal liberty law was entitled, “An act to 
give effect to the provisions of the constitution of the United States relative to fugitives 
from labor, for the protection of free people of color, and to prevent kidnapping.”  Id. at 
550.  A number of northern states passed “personal liberty laws” to prevent the kidnapping 
of free blacks by requiring an inquiry by a state judicial officer before a black could be 
removed from the state as a fugitive slave.  See generally THOMAS D. MORRIS, FREE MEN ALL:  
THE PERSONAL LIBERTY LAWS OF THE NORTH 1780–1861 (1974). 
71 The 1830 census provides information on how many children Morgan had while 
living in Maryland; we know she had at least two more when taken out of Pennsylvania.  
One or both were born in Pennsylvania.  U.S. CENSUS, MANUSCRIPT CENSUS FOR HARFORD 
COUNTY, MARYLAND 394 (1830). 
72 Id. 
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Bemis party to Pennsylvania for trial.  However, after protracted 
negotiations, Maryland authorities returned Prigg (but no one else) to 
Pennsylvania for trial.  An agreement between the two states set the 
stage for the extradition and Prigg’s trial.73  This agreement included a 
promise that Pennsylvania would not incarcerate the alleged kidnapper 
until after he exhausted all appeals and that there would be an expedited 
appeal through the Pennsylvania courts.74  In the Opinion of the Court, 
Justice Joseph Story praised both states for their cooperation in this 
matter when the case reached the U.S. Supreme Court.75 
This agreement illustrates one aspect of human rights law and the 
domestic international law of race.  Pennsylvania was eager to protect its 
free blacks—like Jerry Morgan and his freeborn children—from being 
kidnapped.  Maryland, on the other hand, wanted to eliminate free state 
interference with the rendition of fugitive slaves.  Maryland also did not 
want its citizens incarcerated for kidnapping when they were exercising 
what they believed to be a constitutional right to recover fugitive slaves.  
In the context of human rights, Pennsylvania wanted to protect the 
liberty of its residents while Maryland wanted to protect the property 
claims of its residents.  This agreement was much like a treaty between 
sovereign nations.  Emissaries from the governor of Pennsylvania 
worked out the details of the agreement with men appointed by the 
Maryland governor.  The legislatures of both states ratified the 
agreement, much as national legislatures might ratify a treaty.  The 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court willingly participated, giving a speedy 
review of Prigg’s conviction.  In upholding the conviction, the Court did 
not write an opinion in the case, perhaps because that would have 
slowed down the process.  The Court may also have felt that such an 
opinion would have complicated the appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court.  
With no opinion to respond to, the U.S. Supreme Court crafted its own 
solution to the problem raised by Pennsylvania’s personal liberty law 
and Prigg’s behavior. 
In his opinion of the Court, Justice Joseph Story callously ignored the 
facts of the case.  Importantly, he refused to consider whether Morgan 
was ever actually a slave or whether she ever “escaped” from slavery.  
He noted that some of her children had been born in Pennsylvania, but 
did not offer any analysis of how that fact might affect their status.  In 
                                                 
73 We have no evidence of why Prigg was extradited, rather than Bemis, although it is 
possible that Bemis’s higher social status as a lawyer and an important property owner 
protected him. 
74 For case details, see Finkelman, Story Telling on the Supreme Court, supra note 48. 
75 Prigg, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539.  For a discussion and details of this case, see Finkelman, 
Story Telling on the Supreme Court, supra note 48. 
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effect, Story refused to consider the human rights laws of Pennsylvania, 
which provided that all people born in that state were born free and 
could not be enslaved.  The choice of law here was to favor the property 
rights law of Maryland over the human rights law of Pennsylvania.76   
Instead, Story focused on the importance of the fugitive slave clause, 
and the 1793 federal fugitive slave law, for promoting sectional 
harmony.  In doing this, Story held that masters had the right to take 
fugitive slaves back to the South without any legal process or judicial 
superintendence, as long as this could be accomplished without a 
“breach of the peace.”  This in effect was a green light to kidnappers, 
who could now seize any blacks in the North because no state official 
could interfere with the return of a fugitive slave.  The opinion made 
race the sole criterion for determining who might be seized and taken to 
the South without any due process.  After Prigg, if he could act without 
an obvious breach of the peace, any southerner could seize any black 
person in the North, and take him or her to the South, without any 
interference from Northern authorities.  This made all blacks living near 
the South—in the southern parts of Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Ohio, 
Indiana, and Illinois, as well as those living in port cities such as Boston 
or New York—vulnerable to seizure and a quick removal to a slave state, 
before they could make their plight known to any neighbors. 
Story’s replacement on the Court, Levi Woodbury, took this 
racialization of American law one step further in Jones v. Van Zandt.77  In 
the process, Woodbury added to what might be called the “anti-human 
rights” law of the United States, by in effect holding that all blacks, even 
those in a free state, should be presumed to be slaves. 
The case began when a group of slaves escaped into Ohio from a 
Kentucky slaveowner named Wharton Jones.  In Ohio, just outside of 
Cincinnati, a farmer named John Van Zandt offered a ride in his wagon 
to this group of blacks walking along the road.  Van Zandt later claimed 
that in Ohio all people were presumed free, and thus he committed no 
crime or civil wrong when he offered a ride to these strangers.  In fact, all 
of these people were slaves, owned by Jones.  Jones did not take any 
immediate action to recover the slaves, but a party of freelance 
slavecatchers heard that Jones’s slaves had escaped, and crossed into 
Ohio to find them.  The slavecatchers tried to stop Van Zandt’s wagon, 
but he refused to halt when these unknown and unidentified 
                                                 
76 Story might have compromised here, and declared that the children of Morgan, born 
in Pennsylvania, were free and thus Prigg was legitimately convicted for their kidnapping 
but this would have muddied the waters and prevent Story from writing the emphatically 
proslavery opinion he seemed bent on writing. 
77 46 U.S. (5 How.) 215 (1847). 
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southerners, with no legal process in hand, accosted him.  Eventually 
they stopped the wagon and in the ensuing chaos one of the slaves 
evaded capture and was never returned to Jones.  Van Zandt had no 
legal notice that the people in his wagon were fugitive slaves and 
essentially argued that in the free state of Ohio all people were 
presumptively free.  Then he claimed he had no legal obligation to 
respond to this group of armed ruffians who chased him. 
Speaking for the Court, Woodbury held that Van Zandt was liable 
for the value of the lost slave because he did not need written notice nor 
specific notice from the owner that the people in his wagon were slaves.  
The fact that a group of armed, unknown men from another state—
freelance slave catchers—tried to stop his wagon made no difference.  
Just as Story ignored the free state birth of some of Margaret Morgan’s 
children, Woodbury ignored the illegal violence of self-deputized armed 
ruffians stopping a wagon peacefully traveling down an Ohio road.  The 
law of the United States was now clear:  all people—North and South—
should assume that any black they encountered was a runaway slave.  In 
Dred Scott v. Sandford78 Chief Justice Taney would hold that free blacks 
had no rights under the Constitution.  While stated clearly and starkly, 
Taney’s anti-human rights analysis in that case was in many ways just an 
expansion of the doctrine created in Jones by Justice Woodbury. 
Woodbury asserted that any information that would “satisfy a fair-
minded man that he is concealing the property of another” was sufficient 
to sustain a civil action for harboring a fugitive slave.79  While not 
directly stating it, Woodbury’s assumptions were clear:  Van Zandt 
should have assumed that a group of blacks walking along a road in 
southern Ohio were, or might be, fugitive slaves.  He should further 
have assumed that any white man with a southern accent had a 
legitimate reason to stop his wagon to search it for fugitive slaves.  Race 
was sufficient to justify the suspicion that even in a free state all blacks 
were likely to be runaway slaves.  Race was similarly sufficient to allow 
a search by people who were not even officers of the law.  This case may 
be the first example of the Supreme Court upholding a profile search 
based on race. 
Taken together, Prigg and Van Zandt in effect held that in any choice-
of-law situation involving race, the court should ignore the free state law 
in favor of the law of the slave states.  If this were true, then the common 
presumption of the South, that race determined status, would become 
the law of the nation.  The domestic international law, under these cases, 
                                                 
78  60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
79 Id. at 225. 
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rejected the human rights claims of blacks, but firmly supported the 
property rights claims of southerners. 
B. Slaves in Transit in Free Jurisdictions 
Somerset v. Stewart80 was the first major Anglo-American case 
involving international law concepts and slavery.81  James Somerset was 
the slave of Charles Stewart, a minor colonial official who lived in 
Virginia.  Stewart took Somerset to England in 1769 and held him as a 
slave until he escaped in 1771.  Stewart hired men who captured 
Somerset and placed him on board a ship destined for Jamaica, where he 
was to be sold as a slave.  British opponents of slavery, led by Granville 
Sharp, obtained a writ of habeas corpus to bring Somerset before Chief 
Justice Lord Mansfield of the Court of King's Bench. 
At stake in this case was the status of some 15,000 slaves then living 
in England.  Lord Mansfield tried to avoid the issue and urged the 
parties to settle the case so he would not have to reach a decision.  He 
suggested Mr. Stewart “end the question, by discharging or giving 
freedom to the negro.”82  But, in fact, there was little room for settlement.  
Somerset would take nothing less than his liberty; for Stewart, 
emancipating Somerset was hardly a settlement—it was a total loss.83  
Mansfield was uncomfortable with the potential consequences of the 
case, admitting that “setting 14,000 or 15,000 men at once free loose by a 
solemn opinion, is much disagreeable.”84  But, Mansfield enforced the 
law, no matter what the cost:  “fiat justitia, ruat coelum” he told the 
lawyers for both sides85—let justice be done, though the heavens may 
fall! 
In deciding the case, Mansfield noted that “Contract for sale of a 
slave is good here; the sale is a matter to which the law properly and 
readily attaches, and will maintain the price according to the agreement.  
But here the person of the slave himself is immediately the object of 
                                                 
80 Somerset v. Stewart, (1772) 98 Eng. Rep. 499 (K.B.). 
81 See generally DAVID BRION DAVIS, THE PROBLEM OF SLAVERY IN THE AGE OF 
REVOLUTION 1770–1823, at 469–522 (1975); PAUL FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION:  
SLAVERY, FEDERALISM, AND COMITY (1981, reprint 2001); William M. Wiecek, Somerset:  Lord 
Mansfield and the Legitimacy of Slavery in the Anglo-American World, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 86 
(1974). 
82 He similarly suggested that the “merchants” who thought the case was “of great 
commercial concern” should take the issue to Parliament.  Somerset, 98 Eng. Rep. at 509. 
83  It is not impossible to imagine some compromise, in which Somerset agreed to work 
for Stewart as an indentured servant for a set term, in exchange for his absolute freedom, 
but neither side seemed interested in such a result. 
84 Somerset, 98 Eng. Rep. at 509. 
85 Id. 
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enquiry; which makes a very material difference.”86  This is important, 
because in effect Mansfield acknowledged that international law 
recognized slavery and accepted the system, and that for purposes of 
international commerce, Britain did too.  Thus, in 1772, rather than there 
being an international human rights law, there was an international anti-
human rights law that acknowledged and recognized trafficking in 
human beings.  Mansfield did not reject this rule of law for international 
transactions, but for domestic litigation—when “the person of the slave 
himself” was in Great Britain—he chose to develop a domestic (British) 
human rights law that prohibited slavery. 
In the end, Mansfield issued a narrow opinion.  He would not 
consider the status of all slaves in England; he was not prepared to issue 
an emancipation proclamation for all of Britain.  He simply held that 
Stewart had no grounds to hold Somerset against his will.  Stewart’s 
“return” of the writ of habeas corpus stated “that the slave departed and 
refused to serve; whereupon he was kept, to be sold abroad.”87  This was 
beyond what English law could tolerate, and went directly to the issue of 
international law:  “So high an act of dominion must be recognized by 
the law of the country where it is used.”88  Was there such a “law” in 
England?  Clearly there was not, for: 
[t]he state of slavery is of such a nature, that it is 
incapable of being introduced on any reasons, moral or 
political; but only positive law, which preserves its force 
long after the reason, occasion, and time itself from 
whence it was created, is erased from memory:  it’s so 
odious, that nothing can be suffered to support it, but 
positive law.89 
Thus, the court released Somerset.  Implicitly, any slave taken to any 
common law jurisdiction that did not have slavery would be equally 
entitled to liberty. 
This was what Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw of Massachusetts 
concluded in Commonwealth v. Aves90 six decades later.  Like Somerset, 
this was a case brought by opponents of slavery—this time the Boston 
Female Anti-Slavery Society—to secure the freedom of a slave visiting in 
a free jurisdiction.  The case involved Med, a six-year-old slave girl 
                                                 
86  Id. at 510. 
87 Id. at 510. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. 
90 35 Mass. (18 Pick.) 193 (1836). 
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brought to Boston by Mary Aves Slater, when she returned from New 
Orleans, Louisiana to visit her father, Thomas Aves. 
The case was relatively easy for Chief Justice Shaw to decide.91  Shaw 
was surprised that it was a case of first impression for a Massachusetts 
judge.  But he was firm in concluding that slavery was illegal in 
Massachusetts, and no one could be held a slave in that state, except a 
fugitive who escaped into Massachusetts and whose slave status was 
preserved by the U.S. Constitution.  Clearly, Med was not such a person. 
The only difficult question for Shaw was whether some theory of 
international law, modified and strengthened by the national union and 
the U.S. Constitution, required Massachusetts to recognize the status of 
“slave” conferred on Med by Louisiana law.  Shaw noted that slavery 
was clearly “contrary to natural right, to the principles of justice, 
humanity and sound policy,” but Shaw admitted that slavery was 
certainly not “contrary to the law of nations.”92  He could have hardly 
done otherwise in a nation whose Constitution seemed proslavery to 
many Americans,93 clearly protected the rights of masters to recover 
fugitive slaves in the free states,94 and counted slaves for purposes of 
allocating representation in the national Congress.95  He even admitted 
that under the theory of “lex loci contractus” he would uphold a claim 
under a contract for the sale of slaves if the contract had been made in 
New Orleans.  The legal theory of this was obvious.  Any court should 
enforce a contract if “the contract was a legal one by the law of the place 
where it was made.”96  Like Lord Mansfield in Somerset, he did not find 
slavery contrary to international law.  If there was an international 
human rights law, it did not affect the status of a slave.  Shaw also 
acknowledged that under general notions of international law, personal 
property acquired in one place “by the comity of nations the same must 
be deemed his property everywhere.”97  But, he would not accept such a 
law for the person of a slave.  The theory of personal property adhering 
to the owner could apply “only to those commodities which are 
everywhere, and by all nations, treated and deemed subjects of 
                                                 
91 See FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION, supra note 81, at 101–25; LEVY, supra note 12, at 
101–125. 
92 Aves, 35 Mass. (18 Pick.) at 215. 
93 See PAUL FINKELMAN, SLAVERY AND THE FOUNDERS:  RACE AND LIBERTY IN THE AGE OF 
JEFFERSON 3 (2d ed. 2001), for the proslavery nature of the U.S. Constitution. 
94 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3. 
95 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3. 
96 Aves, 35 Mass. (18 Pick.) at 215.  Lord Mansfield reached the same conclusions in 
Somerset, noting that a contract for sale of a slave in the American colonies would be 
upheld in England.  See Jonathan A. Bush, The British Constitution and the Creation of 
American Slavery, in SLAVERY & THE LAW 379 (Paul Finkelman ed., 1997). 
97 Aves, 35 Mass. (18 Pick.) at 216. 
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property.”98  Otherwise, “the law of slavery must extend to every place 
where such slaves may be carried.”99 
Thus, Shaw found that comity did not require Massachusetts to 
recognize the status of a slave that a foreign law created.  Med was free, 
not because the law of Massachusetts made her free, but because the law 
of Louisiana ceased to have any force over her once her master 
voluntarily removed her from that state.  The status of slave could only 
be maintained under positive law, and no such law was available to 
Med’s owner in Massachusetts.  As in Somerset, this was a decision in 
which local human rights law trumped international law principles that 
denied the liberty to slaves and generally allowed people to move their 
property (including slaves) from one jurisdiction to another. 
Most other northern states followed Shaw’s lead in this area.100  
More importantly, the states accepted the notion that any black traveling 
with a white might be treated as a slave and thus in need of help from 
the legal system.  From the mid-1830s until the beginning of the Civil 
War, white and black abolitionists often intervened to secure the 
freedom of slaves brought into the North.  Just as southern whites 
frequently stopped blacks traveling alone on the suspicion that they 
were fugitive slaves, northerners stopped southern whites traveling with 
blacks on the suspicion they might be bringing slaves into the free states. 
In 1839 whites in Holden, Massachusetts intervened on behalf of 
Anne, a thirteen-year-old black girl they suspected of being a slave.  Mrs. 
Olivia Eames, a native of Massachusetts, who lived in New Orleans, 
brought Anne to the Bay State when she returned home.  Eames’s failure 
to send Anne to school, and of her generally harsh treatment of Anne 
troubled concerned neighbors.  These neighbors feared Eames would 
eventually take Anne back to New Orleans and sell her.  A county court 
ruled that Anne was free and forced Eames to pay nominal damages to 
Anne for illegally holding her in servitude.101 
Similar cases occurred in Connecticut, Pennsylvania, and Ohio, as 
northerners asserted the presumption that visiting blacks might be 
illegally treated as slaves, and thus should be freed.102  These cases might 
be seen as profile stops in reverse.  If a white was traveling in the North 
with a black, this alone was cause to stop the white on suspicion of 
                                                 
98 Id. 
99 Id. 
100 See FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION, supra note 81, for a general discussion and 
analysis of the many slave transit cases that reached northern courts. 
101 HOLDEN ANTI-SLAVERY SOCIETY, REPORT OF THE HOLDEN SLAVE CASE TRIED AT THE 
COURT OF COMMON PLEAS FOR THE COUNTY OF WORCESTER (1839), reprinted in 2 SOUTHERN 
SLAVES IN FREE STATE COURTS:  THE PAMPHLET LITERATURE 41 (Paul Finkelman ed., 1988). 
102 See generally FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION, supra note 81. 
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bringing a slave into a free state.  This jurisprudence applied a domestic 
law of human rights in the face of international concepts of comity and 
property that might have supported slavery. 
Two cases in New York illustrate the importance of using race as a 
criterion for intervention in the late antebellum period and the 
application of state human rights law to domestic international law.  In 
1846, a Georgia sea captain discovered a slave named George Kirk 
hidden on his ship as he headed for New York.  Unwilling to return to 
Savannah, the captain put Kirk in irons and planned to take him back to 
Georgia after he docked in New York and unloaded his cargo.  A black 
stevedore, named Lewis Napoleon, noticed the man in chains, and 
immediately secured a writ of habeas corpus.  The ship captain claimed 
that Kirk was a fugitive slave and that he therefore had a right to take 
him back to Georgia.  But, the fugitive slave law only applied to slaves 
escaping into a state.  Kirk did not do this; rather the captain brought him 
into New York.  This meant Kirk was free.103 
Six years later the same Lewis Napoleon (or as he now spelled it, 
Louis Napoleon), gained the release of eight slaves that a Virginia family 
brought into the state as they changed ships in New York City while 
traveling from Virginia to Texas.  While geographically out of the way, 
the fastest route from Virginia to Texas was in fact to take a ship to New 
York and then a direct steamer to New Orleans.104 
This case began in 1852, but did not reach New York’s highest court 
until 1860.  The court in Lemmon v. The People105 ruled that New York had 
an absolute right to immediately free any slave brought into the state.  
This case was a minor cause célèbre at the time.106  Had the Civil War not 
intervened, this case might very well have reached the Supreme Court, 
which would have probably upheld the right of slave transit, and thus 
given a final decision on the requirement of comity for slave owners.107 
In liberating visiting slaves, Britain and the northern states in effect 
applied their own human rights laws to the status of visitors, despite the 
fact that there was legitimate international law precedent and theory for 
concluding that a state should accept the personal status of visitors from 
other places.  Free jurisdictions usually accepted foreign law involving 
marriage, divorce, child custody, apprenticeship, and other aspects of 
personal status as well as foreign laws creating property and contract 
relations.  This was all consistent with recognized concepts of 
                                                 
103 In re Kirk, 1 Edm. Sel. Cas. 315 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1846). 
104 Lemmon v. The People, 20 N.Y. 562 (1860). 
105 Id. 
106 See FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION, supra note 81, at 296–312. 
107 Id. at 313–38. 
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international law.  It would certainly have been reasonable, within 
generally understood notions of international laws on property and 
personal status, to have recognized the status of visiting slaves.  Instead, 
these free jurisdictions applied their own human rights law to trump 
international law, which did not recognize human rights but did 
recognize property rights in slaves. 
VI.  SLAVERY, RACE, AND DOMESTIC CONFLICTS OF LAW: 
FREE BLACKS IN SLAVE STATES 
A corollary to the problem of slaves entering the North arose when 
free blacks traveled to slave states or when slaves, who had lived in free 
states, returned to slave jurisdictions, either on their own initiative or 
because a master forced such a return. 
There is only one major case on free blacks entering the South.108  
However, the issue led to tense relations between northern and southern 
states, and is a good example of how issues of international law and 
constitutional law are not always resolved in the courts.  This issue is 
also the “purest” antebellum example of race and human rights concerns 
intersecting with domestic international law. Prohibitions on free blacks 
entering the southern states were entirely based on race.  These 
prohibitions also flew in the face of the privileges and immunities clause 
of the Constitution as well as all notions of international comity.  The 
same laws also applied to black citizens of the British Empire.  Thus race 
undermined American foreign policy and prevented the U.S. from fully 
applying accepted concepts of international law to its foreign policy.  
These laws also rejected international law by refusing to acknowledge 
the status of visiting blacks, who were free in places where they lived.  In 
this sense, the southern states substituted their own anti-human rights 
law for international law that would have protected the human rights of 
free blacks. 
In contrast to the single southern federal case involving a free black 
entering the South, many southern states heard cases involving the 
status of slaves who had been taken to a free jurisdiction and then 
returned to a slave state.  In all of those cases, race and color were at 
issue, and in some, race became the central issue.  Two of these cases, 
Strader v. Graham109 and Dred Scott v. Sandford,110 reached the United 
States Supreme Court.  By the late 1850s,  cases on this issue had also 
                                                 
108 Elkison v. Deliesseline, 8 F. Cas. 493 (C.C.D.S.C. 1823) (No. 4,366).  For a discussion of 
Elkison, see infra notes 134–43 and accompanying text. 
109 51 U.S. (10 How.) 82 (1850). 
110 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).  See PAUL FINKELMAN, DRED SCOTT V. SANDFORD:  A BRIEF 
HISTORY WITH DOCUMENTS (1997). 
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become racialized.  At issue was not simply someone’s status as a slave 
or free person, but rather the status of an entire race. 
A. State Regulation of the Ingress of Slaves 
Nations usually have great discretion as to whom they let into their 
jurisdictions.111  While international travel is common today, it still often 
requires passports, visas, proof of identity, proof of financial status, and 
even background checks.  Even in a federal republic, it would be possible 
for one state to bar the admission of people from other states.  The 
United States Constitution, at least in theory, eliminated this problem in 
two ways.  First, it gave Congress plenary power over all matters 
relating to commerce among the states.  Thus, only Congress can 
regulate the interstate movement of people.  Second, the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause of the Constitution112 presumably meant that every 
state had to treat the citizens of every other state with dignity and 
respect. 
Complicating these provisions, however, was the slave trade 
provision of Article I, which declared that:  “The Migration or 
Importation of such Persons as any of the States now existing shall think 
proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the Year 
one thousand eight hundred and eight.”113 
A plain reading of this clause suggests that before 1808 the states 
could permit or exclude the “migration or importation” of “Such 
Persons” at their discretion, and that after 1808, Congress could also 
exclude such people.  The slave trade inspired the drafting of the clause 
                                                 
111 Although beyond the scope of this article, it is worth noting that the United States has 
historically used race as a component of its naturalization and immigration laws.  Before 
the Civil War, naturalization was available only to “whites.”  After the Civil War, 
naturalization expanded to people of African ancestry.  In Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 
178 (1922) and United States v. Thind, 261 U.S. 204 (1923), the United States Supreme Court 
held that under this law people from East and South Asia could not be naturalized.  The 
first restriction on immigration was the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, which was directed 
at a specific racial/ethnic group.  Subsequent immigration laws severely limited, or 
absolutely banned, non-whites from immigrating to the United States.  The precedents 
upholding and interpreting these laws are still valid, and according to Gabriel J. Chin, are 
the last vestiges of legalization of race discrimination in federal law.  See Gabriel J. Chin, 
Segregation’s Last Stronghold:  Race Discrimination and the Constitutional Law of Immigration, 46 
UCLA L. REV. 1, 6, 12–15 (1998) (noting that the right to naturalized citizenship was 
restricted by race from 1790 to 1952, the right to immigrate was restricted by race from 1882 
to 1965, and federal decisions still permit racial discrimination by Congress).  For a 
discussion of the informal and then formal restriction on Japanese immigration, which 
were also based on race, see Paul Finkelman, Race, Federalism, and Diplomacy: The 
Gentlemen's Agreement a Century Later, 56 OSAKA [JAPAN] UNIV. L. REV. 1−30 (2009). 
112 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1. 
113 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, c1. 1. 
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and allowed the states to continue the trade until at least 1808.  Implicit 
in the clause, however, is that after 1808, if Congress chose not to end the 
African slave trade, the states were still free to “admit or exclude” slaves 
on their own. 
Could the same be said for other “Persons” as well?  Surely it 
applied to slaves other than those from Africa.  Surely a state had a right 
to declare that no one could be a slave within its jurisdiction.  Likewise, a 
state could prevent someone from bringing new slaves into its 
jurisdiction.  This, in any event, was what the states must have thought 
when they ratified the Constitution.  At the time, Pennsylvania, 
Connecticut, and Rhode Island banned the importation of any new 
slaves and freed the slaves of visiting masters.  Pennsylvania’s gradual 
Abolition Act of 1780 allowed visiting masters to keep their slaves in the 
state for up to six months.  The law also exempted members of Congress 
and diplomats from the six months rule as long as they held their 
office.114  However, the implication of this law was that the state had the 
power to free the slaves of visitors the moment they were brought into 
the state.  No one at the Constitutional Convention, in any of the state 
ratifying conventions, or in any of the public debates over ratification  
ever expressed a fear that the new frame of government would bar such 
regulation. 
In Groves v. Slaughter,115 the Supreme Court affirmed the right of the 
states to exclude slaves as merchandise.  The case involved a civil suit 
based on the refusal of Groves to pay on a note he had given Slaughter 
for the purchase of slaves that Slaughter brought to Mississippi.  Groves 
argued the sale was void because Mississippi’s 1832 Constitution banned 
the importation of slaves as merchandise.  The Court held in favor of 
Slaughter on the grounds that the 1832 Constitution was not self-
executing, and that Mississippi needed to pass legislation to ban the 
importation of slaves as merchandise.  But the Court clearly believed the 
states had the right and the power to prohibit the introduction of slaves 
as merchandise. 
However, the Justices could not agree on why Mississippi could ban 
the sale of slaves.  Justice McLean asserted that congressional commerce 
power precluded the states from banning any form of merchandise.  
However, McLean argued slaves were not merchandise, but people, and 
thus could be banned.  McLean, the only real opponent of slavery on the 
Court,116 wanted to make sure that slavery was a local institution.  Thus, 
                                                 
114 An Act for the Gradual Abolition of Slavery, PA. STAT. AT LARGE, §881 (1780). 
115 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 449 (1841). 
116  On McLean and antislavery, see Paul Finkleman, John McLean:  Moderate Abolitionist 
and Supreme Court Politician, 62 VAND. L. REV. 519–65 (2009). 
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he argued that “[t]he power over slavery belongs to the states 
respectively.  It is local in its character, and in its effects; and the transfer 
or sale of slaves cannot be separated from this power.  It is, indeed, an 
essential part of it.”117  He further argued that the right to exclude slaves 
was “higher and deeper than the Constitution” because the inherent evil 
of slavery “involves the prosperity, and may endanger the existence of a 
state.”118  The power rested on “the law of self-preservation; a law vital 
to every community, and especially to a sovereign state.”119 
The problem with this analysis, of course, is that it could also cut in 
the opposite direction.  If the outcome rested on the power of a state to 
exclude “persons,” then a slave state could argue that free blacks were a 
threat and should be excluded.  A slave state might even argue that 
abolitionist whites should also be excluded. 
Chief Justice Roger B. Taney concurred in the result of this case by 
arguing for a classic states rights position that any power of the states to 
regulate slavery could not “be controlled by congress, either by virtue of 
its power to regulate commerce, or by virtue of any power conferred by 
the constitution of the United States.”120  Taney was emphatic that the 
regulation of slavery lay “exclusively with the several states; and each of 
them has a right to decide for itself, whether it will, or will not, allow 
persons of this description to be brought within its limits, from another 
state, either for sale, or for any other purpose.”121 
Neither McLean nor Taney offered an analysis that was completely 
coherent or wholly useful for either of their agendas.  Under McLean’s 
theory, a slave state might refuse to allow a free black, or even a white 
abolitionist, to enter its domain.  This was not something that McLean 
would have wanted.  Under Taney’s theory, on the other hand, a free 
state could prevent any master from traveling with a slave in or through 
its jurisdiction.  Although Taney never actually faced such a case while 
on the Court, had he done so he would have likely upheld the right of a 
master to travel through a free state with his slaves.  This would have 
been consistent with his proslavery jurisprudence122 and foreshadowed 
                                                 





122 See Paul Finkelman, “Hooted Down the Page of History”:  Reconsidering the Greatness of 
Chief Justice Taney, 19 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 83 (1994). 
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the concurring opinion in Dred Scott v. Sandford by Justice Samuel 
Nelson.123 
Taney’s position also comports with his concurring opinion in Prigg 
v. Pennsylvania124 the following year.  There Taney argued that the 
federal government had plenary power over the regulation of the return 
of fugitive slaves, and even argued that the national government had the 
power to require the states to help in the return of fugitive slaves.  Thus, 
in fact Taney believed the regulation of slavery lay “exclusively with the 
several states”125 only to the extent that the states protected slavery.  
When necessary, Taney appeared to be willing to allow the federal 
government to regulate slavery in order to protect a master’s interest in 
his slave property. 
Yet, despite Chief Justice Taney’s mixed messages on the power of 
the states to regulate slavery, the Constitution clearly seemed to require 
that people be able to move from place to place without state 
interference.  Passports, visas, and even identification papers would 
seem to be an unconstitutional burden on interstate movement.  Indeed, 
the right to move from state to state seemed to be a fundamental purpose 
of the Constitution and a basic aspect of domestic human rights at this 
time.  If there was to be any regulation of this movement, Congress, 
through its commerce power, would be the body to make such 
regulations.  But, slavery and race undermined the chances of this 
smoothly happening. 
B. Free Blacks Entering the Slave South 
Why would any African American even want to enter the slave 
South?  The concept seems chilling.  But, for business or pleasure, free 
blacks did have an occasion to do so.  Some free blacks in the North had 
enslaved relatives and went south to visit them.  Other blacks came as 
part of their work.  In New England a large population of black men 
were merchant seamen whose ships often called on southern ports. 
Southern fears of free blacks were not totally unfounded.  Some 
blacks returned to the South with more than mere visits in mind.  Harriet 
Tubman126 made numerous forays into the South to help relatives and 
other slaves escape from bondage.  Dangerfield Newby, one of John 
Brown’s raiders, hoped to rescue his wife from bondage.  After Newby 
                                                 
123 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 454 (1857) (Wayne, J.; Nelson, J.; Grier, J.; Daniel, 
J.; Campbell, J., Catron, J., concurring).  For further development of this argument, see 
FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION, supra note 81, at 313–38. 
124 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842). 
125 Groves, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) at 508. 
126 Tubman was technically a fugitive slave, but she acted as a free person. 
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died in the raid, a Louisiana slave trader bought his wife.127  The case of 
Kentucky v. Dennison emerged out of the attempts of Kentucky to obtain 
custody of Willis Lago, a free black from Ohio who had gone into 
Kentucky and helped a slave woman escape to Cincinnati.128  Even 
casual black visitors to the South could undermine slavery.  Frederick 
Douglass escaped from bondage carrying identification papers lent to 
him by a free black sailor from the North.129 
Ever fearful of free blacks, especially from the outside, most 
southern states prohibited them from entering their domains.  Between 
1820 and 1860 every southern coastal state, except Mississippi,130 passed 
a law regulating black sailors who entered their ports.  The non-coastal 
states also prohibited free blacks from other states from entering their 
jurisdictions.  Kentucky’s 1850 Constitution, for example, directed the 
general assembly to pass legislation making it a felony for free blacks to 
move into the state.131  A brief look at the South Carolina experience 
illustrates the problem. 
In 1800, South Carolina prohibited free blacks from entering the 
state.132  This was the first of many such laws on this subject.  In 1820 
South Carolina prohibited all manumissions within the state and 
reiterated its prohibition on any free blacks entering the state.133  South 
Carolina’s laws provided for free blacks entering the state to be 
incarcerated or sold for a short period of time.  If these free blacks 
persisted in living in the state, they could eventually be sold into lifetime 
slavery. 
In the 1820s South Carolina passed laws, known as the “Negro 
Seamen’s Acts,” restricting free black sailors from entering the state.134  
                                                 
127 STEPHEN B. OATES, TO PURGE THIS LAND WITH BLOOD:  A BIOGRAPHY OF JOHN BROWN 
316 (1970). 
128 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66 (1860). 
129 FREDERICK DOUGLAS, LIFE AND TIMES OF FREDERICK DOUGLAS (1892). 
130 By the late antebellum period, North Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Louisiana, 
and Texas required the immediate imprisonment of black sailors entering those states.  
Virginia restricted their movement and allowed for their enslavement if they remained in 
the state.  Lacking a major port, Mississippi did not pass any specific law dealing with 
black seamen, but restricted the movement of all free blacks in the state and prohibited free 
blacks from entering the state. 
131 KY. CONST. of 1850, art. X, § 2. 
132 “AN ACT for the better regulation and government of Free Negroes and Persons of 
Color; and for other purposes,” 7 Stat. S.C. 461 (1822). 
133 ”AN ACT to restrain the emancipation of Slaves, and to prevent Free persons of Color 
from entering into this State; and for other purposes,” 7 Stat. S.C. 459 (1820). 
134 See  “AN ACT for the better regulation and government of Free Negroes and Persons 
of Color; and for other purposes,” 7 Stat. S.C. 461 (1822).  See also subsequent acts of a 
similar nature:  “AN ACT more effectually to prevent Free Negroes and other Persons of 
Color from entering into this State; and for other purposes,” 7 Stat. S.C. 470 (1835); “AN 
Finkelman: When International Law Was a Domestic Problem
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2010
808 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44 
Under these laws, any black sailor who entered the port of Charleston 
would be immediately seized and incarcerated for the time that the 
sailor’s ship was in port.  When the ship left port, the sailor would be 
placed on board, provided that the ship captain paid the jail fees for the 
free black. 
The Negro Seamen’s Acts presumptively violated the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause of the Constitution when applied to free blacks from 
other states and violated various treaties when applied to free blacks 
from other countries.135  South Carolina, however, saw these as simple 
police regulations—health and safety regulations—designed to protect 
the state from an inherently dangerous class:  free blacks.  Here the 
construction of race—the notion that blacks are inherently dangerous 
people136—undermined interstate comity, and severely impacted 
America’s domestic international law.  These laws also affected our 
foreign relations and put the nation in opposition to basic human 
rights—that free people from one country could visit another country. 
South Carolina’s Negro Seamen’s Acts came before a federal court in 
Elkison v. Deliesseline.137  In 1822, Charleston authorities imprisoned 
Henry Elkison, a black British subject.  Elkison applied for a writ of 
habeas corpus from United States Supreme Court Justice William 
Johnson, a native of South Carolina, who was riding circuit at the time.  
A South Carolina states’ rights organization hired two leading 
proslavery activists, Benjamin F. Hunt and Isaac E. Holmes, to oppose 
the writ. 
In oral argument, before Justice Johnson, Hunt asserted that under 
its police powers South Carolina could incarcerate free blacks entering 
the state, because to do otherwise would make the state “guilty of an act, 
tending to self-destruction.”138  Hunt admitted that Congress had “an 
exclusive right,” under the Constitution to regulate commerce, but he 
denied that South Carolina’s act infringed on congressional power.139  He 
compared South Carolina’s law to a New York law allowing the 
                                                                                                             
ACT the more effectually to prohibit Free Negroes and Persons of Colour from entering 
into this State; and for other purposes,” 7 Stat. S.C. 463 (1823). 
135 Paul Finkelman, The Constitution and the Intentions of the Framers:  The Limits of 
Historical Analysis, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 349 (1989). 
136 See Paul Finkelman, The Crime of Color, 67 TUL. L. REV. 2063 (1993), for more on this 
theory. 
137 Elkison v. Deliesseline, 8 F. Cas. 493 (C.C.D.S.C. 1823) (No. 4,366). 
138 BENJAMIN F. HUNT, THE ARGUMENT OF BENJAMIN FANEUIL HUNT, IN THE CASE OF THE 
ARREST OF THE PERSON CLAIMING TO BE A BRITISH SEAMAN . . . BEFORE THE HON. JUDGE 
JOHNSON, CIRCUIT JUDGE OF THE UNITED STATES, FOR 6TH CIRCUIT 12–14 (1823), reprinted in 2 
FREE BLACKS, SLAVES, AND SLAVEOWNERS IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL COURTS 1 (Paul 
Finkelman ed., 1988). 
139 Id. at 12. 
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quarantine of vessels and individuals.  For South Carolina, the 
“contagion” feared was not disease, but free blacks.140 
Hunt boldly asserted that the slave states were exempt from certain 
constitutional provisions because the federal government could not 
interfere with any law which might affect the domestic institutions of the 
state.  South Carolina’s right to regulate free blacks from other states 
“was one, which from its nature, under the peculiar circumstances of her 
slave population, she could not and has not surrendered to the Federal 
Government.”141 
Hunt’s argument went directly to the issue of domestic international 
law.  South Carolina’s white population believed free blacks were a 
thoroughly dangerous class of people, who could undermine their 
society.  Thus, South Carolina was prepared to deny basic rights to 
citizens of other countries or states, solely on the basis of race.  
Anticipating Story’s theories of comity, Hunt argued that South Carolina 
was only willing to extend comity to aliens whose presence in the state 
did not, to use Story’s language, “prejudice the powers or rights” of 
South Carolina.142 
In his circuit court opinion, Supreme Court Justice William Johnson 
asserted that South Carolina’s law was  flatly “unconstitutional and 
void.”143  Johnson declared the law was altogether irreconcilable with the 
powers of the general government; that it necessarily compromises the 
public peace, and, “tends to embroil us with, if not separate us from, our 
sister states; in short, that it leads to a dissolution of the Union, and 
implies a direct attack upon the sovereignty of the United States.”144  In 
effect, Johnson argued that the Constitution suspended the power of 
South Carolina to act as an independent legal entity, and thus to 
unilaterally decide who could enter the state and who could not.  Justice 
Johnson believed “every arrest made under it subjects the parties making 
it to an action of trespass.”145  Unfortunately for Elkison, Johnson 
asserted that he lacked the power to issue a writ of habeas corpus or in 
any other way interfere with the law.  The law was unconstitutional, but 
the parties could find no justice in the federal courts.  Johnson, in effect, 
refused to enforce his ruling. 
                                                 
140 Id. at 14. 
141 Id. at 4. 
142 STORY, CONFLICT, supra note 48, at 30.  See also HUNT, supra note 138, at 4 (discussing a 
South Carolina law that directed Sheriffs to hold in custody all Africans arriving at South 
Carolina ports until the ship they arrived on is ready to set sail). 
143 Elkison v. Deliesseline, 8 F. Cas. 493, 494 (C.C.D.S.C. 1823) (No. 4,366). 
144 Id. 
145 Id. at 496. 
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South Carolina was not the only state to adopt restrictions on 
migrants based on color.  By 1860 every southern state prohibited the 
migration of free blacks.146  Southern states believed free blacks 
threatened slavery and would have a pernicious influence on the 
behavior of slaves.  Thus, the notion of race, and belief that race was tied 
to criminality and danger, affected the domestic international law of the 
United States and led to one state refusing to respect the rights of people 
who were citizens of another state.  Through these statutes, the American 
South rejected the basic human rights of citizens of other nations and 
states. 
Initially, the free states acquiesced in this result.  Perhaps they acted 
in this way because Elkison was a British subject and because few 
politicians in the North cared much about the fate of free blacks.  But, the 
rise of the antislavery movement and the growing sectional tensions over 
slavery and race led to a change of attitude in Massachusetts.  The Bay 
State was particularly affected by these laws because of its large number 
of free black seamen. 
In 1839, the Massachusetts legislature demanded a repeal of the 
Black Seamen’s Acts.  The legislature declared it was the “paramount 
duty of the state to protect its citizens in the enjoyment and exercise of all 
their rights.”147  In 1842, over 150 Bostonians asked Congress to intervene 
to prevent the imprisonment of northern black seamen.148  The 
petitioners, including many conservative businessmen, asked Congress 
to “render effectual in their behalf . . . the privileges of citizenship, 
secured by the Constitution of the United States.”149  A House committee 
vainly recommended favorable action on the petition.150 
With Congress unable or unwilling to act on the issue, 
Massachusetts tried direct negotiations with the two most important 
southern states implementing these laws:  South Carolina and Louisiana.  
Acting as if it were dealing with foreign nations, Massachusetts, in 1844, 
sent Samuel Hoar to Charleston and Henry Hubbard to New Orleans as 
official state commissioners to negotiate a compromise on this issue.  The 
missions were fiascoes.  Hoar spent a single night in Charleston before 
officials told him they could not guarantee his safety.  After Hoar had 
                                                 
146  Paul Finkelman, States Rights North and South in Antebellum America, in AN UNCERTAIN 
TRADITION:  CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE HISTORY OF THE SOUTH 125, 132–33 (Kermit Hall 
& James W. Ely, Jr. eds., 1989). 
147 Report of the Joint Committee on the Deliverance of Citizens, Liable to be sold as Slaves, H.R. 
REP. NO. 38 (Mass. 1839). 
148 FREE COLORED SEAMEN—MAJORITY AND MINORITY REPORTS, H.R. Doc. No. 80-2, at 1 
(1843) [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT]. 
149 Id. 
150 Id. at 6–7. 
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returned to Massachusetts, the South Carolina legislature gratuitously 
asked the governor to expel him from the state, declaring that Hoar was 
an “emissary sent . . . with avowed purpose of interfering with” South 
Carolina’s “institutions, and disturbing her peace.”151  In Louisiana, 
Hubbard faced the very real prospect of being lynched.  He left New 
Orleans on the same day he arrived.  Subsequent communications from 
Massachusetts to these states were fruitless.152 
After the abortive missions by Hoar and Hubbard, the Georgia 
legislature jumped to the defense of South Carolina and Louisiana.  In an 
analysis, which anticipated Chief Justice Roger B. Taney’s Dred Scott 
opinion, the Georgia legislature asserted that each state, “in the exercise 
of their sovereign rights,” could determine for itself who was a citizen 
and who was not.  The southern states “did not regard” free blacks as 
citizens, a fact “of which the authorities of Massachusetts could not have 
been ignorant at the time of her aggressions.”  The legislature declared 
that “the people of South Carolina, Louisiana, Georgia, as well as all the 
States, claim the right of thinking for themselves.”153  In doing so, they 
chose to reject any claims of citizenship and obligations of comity 
towards free blacks from other states.  In the language of human rights, 
the states of the Deep South were ready to assert the right to decide who 
was entitled to such rights and who was not. 
These incidents were not quickly forgotten in the North.  When 
introducing what eventually became the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution, Congressman John Bingham gave the example of Hoar’s 
expulsion from South Carolina as one reason why the amendment was 
needed.154  The Fourteenth Amendment would in fact overrule the right 
of the states to ban the movement of citizens from other states, and thus 
apply a fundamental human right to the domestic international law of 
the United States.  Even the post-Civil War court, which was consistently 
reluctant to interpret the Fourteenth Amendment to further civil rights—
what can be called domestic human rights—accepted the idea that the 
New Amendment protected a right to travel.  Thus, even while virtually 
destroying the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment in The Slaughterhouse Cases,155 Justice Miller did admit that 
                                                 
151 South Carolina on the Mission of Samuel Hoar:  December 5, 1844, reprinted in STATE 
DOCUMENTS ON FEDERAL RELATIONS:  THE STATES AND THE UNITED STATES 238 (Herman V. 
Ames ed., 1970). 
152 HENRY WILSON, HISTORY OF THE RISE AND FALL OF THE SLAVE POWER IN AMERICA 576–
86 (1872). 
153 Report of the Committee on the State of the Republic, assented to Dec. 19, 1845, ACTS OF 
GEORGIA 209–11 (1845). 
154 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 157–58 (1866). 
155  83 U.S. 36, 39–40 (1873). 
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one of the concrete privileges and immunities of federal citizenship was 
the right to travel from place to place.  Before the Civil War the South 
denied this right to free blacks and, in the case of Hoar and Hubbard, 
also to whites who supported the rights for free blacks.  However, 
despite the apparent constitutionalization of this right, the former slave 
states resisted a full application of the principle until the late 1960s.156 
C. Former Slaves Returning to the South After Sojourn or Emancipation in 
the North 
Initially most southern states accepted the concept articulated by 
Somerset v. Stewart that a slave voluntarily brought to a free jurisdiction 
became free.  In his opinion in Aves, Chief Justice Shaw quoted a 
Louisiana case and a Kentucky case supporting this position.157  
Indicative of this early position was Harry v. Decker & Hopkins, where the 
Mississippi Supreme Court declared that courts should decide “in favour 
of liberty” when facing such questions.158 
By and large the early southern cases dealing with slave transit were 
surprisingly non-racialized and also surprisingly respectful of the 
fundamental rights of free blacks.  Southern jurists in Missouri,159 
Virginia,160 Kentucky,161 Louisiana,162 and Mississippi,163 applied the 
Somerset doctrine without much concern for race.  These states accepted 
that slavery was protected by international law and certainly by the 
constitutions and laws of their own states.  But they also accepted the 
idea that freedom was a fundamental human right, and that slavery, 
                                                 
156 See e.g., the Virginia laws and decisions at issue in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).  
Here the U.S. Supreme Court struck down Virginia’s laws, and all other state laws which 
made it a crime for people of different races to marry.  Id.  Under these laws, people 
lawfully married in one state could not travel to other states where their interracial 
marriages were illegal.  See also PETER WALLENSTEIN, TELL THE COURT I LOVE MY WIFE:  
RACE, MARRIAGE, AND LAW—AN AMERICAN HISTORY (2002) (giving a history of state laws, 
which make interracial marriage a crime). 
157 See also Rankin v. Lydia, 9 Ky. (2 A.K. Marsh) 467 (1820) (being cited by Shaw); 
Lunsford v. Coquillon, 2 Mart (n.s.) 401 (La. 1824) (being cited by Shaw). 
158 Harry v. Decker & Hopkins, 1 Miss. (1 Walker) 36 (1818). 
159 Winny v. Whitesides, 1 Mo. 472 (1824).  See also FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION, 
supra note 81, at 217–28 (discussing the Missouri cases). 
160 Betty v. Horton, 32 Va. (5 Leigh) 615 (1833); Hunter v. Fulcher, 28 Va. (1 Leigh) 172 
(1829); Spotts v. Gillaspie, 27 Va. (6 Rand.) 566 (1828); Griffith v. Fanny, 21 Va. (Gilmer) 143 
(1820). 
161 Rankin, 9 Ky. (2 A.K. Marsh) 467; FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION, supra note 81, at 
190–205 (discussing the cases following and supporting Rankin). 
162 See Lunsford, 2 Mart. (n.s.) 401; FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION, supra note 81, at 
206–16 (discussing Lunsford and other Louisiana cases). 
163 See Harry, 1 Miss. (1 Walker) 36; FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION, supra note 81, at 
228–35 (discussing Mississippi cases). 
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while legitimate under international and domestic law, had to be 
supported by local positive law or treaty.  Ironically, some of these early 
cases used race as a marker, not to protect slavery, but to protect 
freedom.  Thus, while blackness created a presumption of slavery, a 
mixed blood heritage created a presumption of freedom.164  In Adelle v. 
Beauregard the Louisiana Court upheld the freedom of a mulatto woman 
who had lived in New York.  It is not clear if the court based its decision 
on her mixed-race heritage, her residence in New York, or a combination 
of the two, which together shifted to Beauregard the burden of proving 
that Adelle was a slave, rather than requiring Adelle to prove she was 
free. 
D. Dred Scott v. Sandford 
Throughout the 1830s and 1840s most southern states still followed 
the Somerset rule, although with increasing reluctance in Mississippi, 
Virginia, and a few other places.165  Courts in Louisiana, Kentucky, and 
Missouri, however, continued to accept the idea that foreign law could 
free a slave, and once free, the slave was always free.166  As late as 1850 
an obscure slave named Dred Scott won his freedom from a St. Louis 
Circuit Court based on his previous residence in Illinois and at Fort 
Snelling, in present day Minnesota, which at the time was part of the 
Wisconsin Territory.  This area had been made free by the Missouri 
Compromise of 1820. 
Dred Scott’s owner, Mrs. Irene Emerson, refused to accept the result 
in this case.  She appealed to the Missouri Supreme Court, which set the 
stage for a reversal of southern jurisprudence on slave transit, and for 
federal intervention leading to a full racialization of domestic 
international law in the United States and a rejection of the human rights 
implications of Somerset. 
In Scott v. Emerson167 the Missouri Supreme Court reversed nearly 
thirty years of precedents, dating from the very beginning of the state, to 
hold that Dred Scott did not gain his freedom by living in free 
jurisdictions.  The opinion of the court was fundamentally political, with 
Justice William Scott arguing that “[t]imes are not now as they were 
when the former decisions on this subject were made.”168  Justice Scott 
complained of a “dark and fell spirit” that had taken over the free states 
                                                 
164 Adelle v. Beauregard, 1 Mart. (o.s.) 183 (La. 1810); Gobu v. Gobu, 1 N.C. (Tay.) 188 
(1802); Hudgins v. Wrights, 11 Va. (1 Hen. & M.) 134 (1806). 
165 FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION, supra note 81, at 189. 
166 Id. at 181–235. 
167 Scott v. Emerson, 15 Mo. 576 (1852). 
168 Id. 
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and led them to attack the institutions of the South.169  Quoting Story’s 
treatise on conflicts, he noted that “the comity of nations is derived 
altogether from the voluntary consent of the State by which it is shown, 
and is inadmissible when it is contrary to its known policy or prejudicial 
to its interests.”170  Emancipating slaves was “contrary” to the interests of 
Missouri, and the state supreme court would have no part of it. 
While mostly an attack on the free states, the majority opinion also 
wandered into the realm of racial theory.  Justice Scott denied that 
slavery harmed blacks, and in fact argued that slaves in America were 
better off than: 
the cruel, uncivilized negro in Africa.  When the 
condition of our slaves is contrasted with the state of 
their miserable race in Africa; when their civilization, 
intelligence and instruction in religious truths are 
considered . . . we are almost persuaded, that the 
introduction of slavery amongst us was, in the 
providence of God, who makes the evil passions of men 
subservient to His own glory, a means of placing that 
unhappy race within the pale of civilized nations.171 
If this was so, then it made no sense for Missouri to give force to 
either the laws of Illinois or of the United States that emancipated a 
slave.  Blacks were better off as slaves, free blacks were a dangerous class 
of people, and slaves were a valuable form of property.  Thus, Missouri 
rejected the notion that it should give any respect to law of the free states 
or of the national government that could make slaves free people. 
The position of the Missouri Supreme Court raises, for the modern 
reader, a new and perverse sense of what “human rights law” can look 
like.  The Missouri Court had accepted and adopted the proslavery 
theories of race and religion that had been growing since Thomas 
Jefferson published his Notes on the State of Virginia in 1784, arguing that 
blacks were mentally and morally inferior to whites.172  In effect, the 
Court held that because blacks were naturally inferior to whites, and 
Africa was deeply uncivilized, there should be a different standard of 
human rights for blacks.  It was not a violation of human rights to 
enslave blacks, but on the contrary human rights for blacks, according to 
the Missouri Court, required enslavement. 




172  For a brief introduction to this literature, and an easy access to Jefferson’s racial  
views, see PAUL FINKELMAN, DEFENDING SLAVERY:  PROSLAVERY IN THE OLD SOUTH (2003). 
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Two years after losing before the state supreme court, Dred Scott 
managed to bring his case into federal court.  He lost at trial and took his 
case to the United States Supreme Court.  After two sets of oral 
arguments, the Court finally decided the case in March 1857.  
Undoubtedly the most controversial case of the century,173 the case did 
not fully settle the conflicts-of-law question raised by slave transit in free 
states.  Relying on Strader v. Graham,174 which the Court decided in 1850, 
the majority Justices easily reaffirmed that a slave state had the right to 
decide, for itself, if it would honor any slave’s claim to freedom based on 
free state residence. 
This resolved Scott’s claim to freedom based on his earlier residence 
in Illinois.  It did not, however, solve the problem of his residence at Fort 
Snelling in the federal territory made free by the Missouri Compromise.  
Missouri might choose to ignore Illinois law and declare that his 
residence in the state did not make him free.  But the Missouri 
Compromise was a federal law, and under the Supremacy Clause of the 
Constitution175 the Missouri judges were bound to enforce it.  In his 
controversial opinion, Chief Justice Taney solved the problem by 
declaring the Missouri Compromise unconstitutional. 
In addition to these two prongs of his holding, Taney held that 
blacks could never be citizens of the United States and that historically 
they “had no rights which the white man was bound to respect.”176  
Taney long held this position.  As attorney general in the 1830s, he 
argued that “[blacks] are not looked upon as citizens by the contracting 
parties who formed the Constitution.  They were evidently not supposed 
to be included by the term citizens.”177  Speaking for the Court, Taney 
stated the issue: 
 The question is simply this:  Can a negro, whose 
ancestors were imported into this country, and sold as 
slaves, become a member of the political community 
formed and brought into existence by the Constitution of 
the United States, and as such become entitled to all the 
rights, and privileges, and immunities, guarantied by 
                                                 
173 See DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE:  ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN 
LAW AND POLITICS (1978); FINKELMAN, DRED SCOTT V. SANDFORD, supra note 110. 
174 Strader v. Graham, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 82 (1850). 
175 U.S. CONST., art. VI, § 2.  The Supremacy Clause states:  “This Constitution, and the 
Laws of the United which shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law 
of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby . . . .”  Id. 
176 Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407 (1856). 
177 Unpublished Opinion of Attorney General Taney, quoted in CARL BRENT SWISHER, 
ROGER B. TANEY 154 (1935). 
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that instrument to the citizen? One of which rights is the 
privilege of suing in a court of the United States in the 
cases specified in the Constitution.178 
Taney knew that blacks voted in nearly half the states at the time of 
the adoption of the Constitution.  And even though blacks lost political 
rights in a number of states, in some states they still were citizens with 
the same rights as white citizens.  In some states blacks were attorneys 
and held public offices.179  They could vote equally with whites in five 
states180 and had limited voting rights in three others.181  Still, Taney 
found a way around this evidence.  He claimed that: 
 [i]n discussing this question, we must not confound 
the rights of citizenship which a State may confer within 
its own limits, and the rights of citizenship as a member 
of the Union.  It does not by any means follow, because 
he has all the rights and privileges of a citizen of a State, 
that he must be a citizen of the United States.  He may 
have all of the rights and privileges of the citizen of a 
State, and yet not be entitled to the rights and privileges 
of a citizen in any other State.182 
Taney based this novel argument entirely on race using his slanted 
and one-sided history of the founding period.  Ignoring the history of 
black voting, the Chief Justice nevertheless argued that at the founding 
of the nation, blacks were either all slaves or, if free, without any political 
or legal rights.  He declared that blacks: 
are not included, and were not intended to be included, 
under the word ‘citizens’ in the Constitution, and can 
therefore claim none of the rights and privileges which 
that instrument provides for and secures to citizens of 
the United States.  On the contrary, they were at that 
time [1787] considered as a subordinate and inferior 
class of beings, who had been subjugated by the 
dominant race, and, whether emancipated or not, yet 
                                                 
178 Sandford, 60 U.S. (10 How.) at 403. 
179 Paul Finkelman, Not Only the Judges’ Robes Were Black:  African-American Lawyers as 
Social Engineers, 47 STAN. L. REV. 161 (1994). 
180 Maine, Vermont, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Massachusetts. 
181 They had to meet a property requirement in New York; they could vote in school 
board elections in Michigan; in Ohio people of mixed ancestry who were more than half 
white could vote. 
182 Sandford, 60 U.S. (10 How.) at 405. 
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remained subject to their authority, and had no rights or 
privileges but such as those who held the power and the 
Government might choose to grant them.183 
According to Taney, at the founding of the United States blacks were “so 
far inferior, that they had no rights which the white man was bound to 
respect.”184  Thus, he concluded that blacks could never be citizens of the 
United States, even if they were born in the country and considered to be 
citizens of the states in which they lived. 
This racially based conclusion did not fully decide the conflicts-of-
law issue since it did not prevent northern states from freeing visiting 
slaves.  The decision did, however, guarantee freedom to the slave states 
to treat free blacks in whatever way they might wish.  It 
constitutionalized the Missouri Court’s view that human rights for 
blacks meant enslavement. 
While Taney did not address the issue of slaves being brought to free 
states, Justice Samuel Nelson offered an ominous hint in his concurrence.  
Perhaps with the Lemmon case in mind, he wrote: 
A question has been alluded to, on the argument, 
namely:  the right of the master with his slave of transit 
into or through a free State, on business or commercial 
pursuits, or in the exercise of a Federal right, or the 
discharge of a Federal duty, being a citizen of the United 
States, which is not before us.  This question depends 
upon different considerations and principles from the 
one in hand, and turns upon the rights and privileges 
secured to a common citizen of the republic under the 
Constitution of the United States.  When that question 
arises, we shall be prepared to decide it.185 
It takes little imagination to guess how the Court would decide such a 
case if it had come before it. 
E. Mitchell v. Wells and the Final Racialization of Antebellum Domestic 
International Law 
In 1846, Edward Wells, a Mississippi planter, took his slave Nancy to 
Ohio, where he formally manumitted her.  This was more an act of love 
than charity.  In addition to being his slave, Nancy was Wells’ daughter.  
                                                 
183 Id. at 404–05. 
184 Id. at 407. 
185 Id. at 468 (Nelson, J. concurring). 
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Wells also took Nancy’s mother to Indiana, where he manumitted her 
and bought her land.  In 1848 Wells died and bequeathed to his daughter 
three thousand dollars and two very personal items:  his bed and his 
watch. 
Nancy Wells spent the next decade attempting to recover her legacy.  
In the end she failed.  In Mitchell v. Wells186 Justice William Harris ruled 
that whatever her status was in Ohio, Wells would always be considered 
a slave in Mississippi.  This was not a slave transit case in the normal 
sense.  Nancy had not gained her freedom in Ohio through the 
application of the Somerset principle while her master traveled to that 
state.  On the contrary, Edward Wells took Nancy to Ohio with the 
express plan of freeing her, and he did so according to all the rules and 
regulations of that state.  Thus, the master’s deliberate acts, not the 
intervention of a free state, led to Nancy’s freedom.  Nor did Nancy seek 
to assert her freedom in Mississippi.  She had no interest in living in the 
state, and there is no indication that she ever physically returned to 
Mississippi after her father’s death. 
While not a transit case, this case was very much an example of 
American domestic international law. The issue was whether Mississippi 
would recognize Nancy’s status in Ohio, solely for the purpose of 
inheriting her legacy.  Since Mississippi had no rule that barred residents 
of other states from inheriting in Mississippi, there was no reason, it 
would seem, to deny Nancy her inheritance. 
But, Justice Harris developed a reason.  Nancy was born a slave, and 
was of African (and also of course white) ancestry.  Race and the 
circumstances of her birth were the key to Nancy’s status.  She was born 
a slave in Mississippi and, under Harris’s view, would always be one.  
Harris would not recognize Nancy’s new status because “comity is 
subordinate to sovereignty, and cannot, therefore, contravene our public 
policy, or the rights, interests, or safety of our State or people.”187  In 
other words, Mississippi would flatly deny that another state could 
convey any rights on a Mississippi born slave.  “[T]he status of a 
[Mississippi] slave,” he asserted, “is fixed by our laws, and cannot be 
changed elsewhere, so as to give him a new status in this State, without 
our consent.”188 
This decision was surely the highpoint of proslavery legal theory.  
But, Harris’s argument was fundamentally also about race and the 
emerging southern notion that human rights for blacks required slavery.  
Turning notions of comity inside out, Harris argued that Ohio violated 
                                                 
186 Mitchell v. Wells, 37 Miss. 235 (1859). 
187 Id. at 249. 
188 Id. (emphasis added). 
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the unwritten rules of domestic interstate comity in the United States by 
“seek[ing] to introduce into the family of States, as equals or associates, a 
caste of [a] different color, and of acknowledged inferiority, who, though 
existing among us at the time of our compact of Union, were excluded 
from the sisterhood of common consent.”189  Harris argued that Ohio 
forced a breakdown in interstate comity by violating the rules of the 
United States as Harris understood them.  Comity with Ohio was 
impossible because Ohio: 
forgetful of her constitutional obligations to the whole 
race, and afflicted with a negro-mania, which inclines her 
to descend, rather than elevate herself in the scale of 
humanity, chooses to take to her embrace, as citizens, 
the neglected race . . . incapable of the blessings of free 
government, and occupying, in the order of nature, an 
intermediate state between the irrational animal and the 
white man.190 
In reality, blacks had virtually no political rights in Ohio191 and were 
certainly not equal in the state.  But, this reality, or any other, was no 
longer relevant to Harris.  His goal was to use this case to reaffirm that 
Mississippi would never grant comity to any free state rule or decision 
that gave blacks any rights at all.  He furthermore saw an opportunity to 
chastise the North for its opposition to slavery and its growing support 
of some rights for blacks.  He considered it “disrespectful” to Mississippi 
and a “lawless interference” with Mississippi’s rights192 for Ohio to even 
allow a Mississippi master to free his slave.  The mere suggestion that 
Mississippi should recognize the new status of Nancy Wells truly 
repulsed Harris: 
 But when I am told that Ohio has not only the right 
thus to degrade and disgrace herself, and wrong us, but 
also, that she has the right to force her new associates 
                                                 
189 Id. at 261. 
190 Id. at 262–63 (emphasis added). 
191 See Finkelman, Not Only the Judges’ Robes Were Black, supra note 179, at 161–209 
(discussing that where completely segregated schools existed, blacks were allowed to vote 
for members of their school boards and that Blacks in Ohio were not, at this time, 
prevented from holding office as evidenced by one black, John Langston, who had been 
elected to office in the hotbed of radical abolition, Oberlin, Ohio).  At this time blacks could 
not serve on juries or in the militia, two key components of nineteenth century citizenship.  
On the history of black rights in Ohio, see Paul Finkelman, Strange Career of Race 
Discrimination in Antebellum Ohio, 55 CASE WESTERN RESERVE UNIV. L. REV. 373–408 (2004). 
192 Mitchell, 37 Miss. at 263. 
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into the Mississippi branch of the American family, to 
claim and exercise rights here, which our laws have 
always denied to this inferior race, and that Mississippi 
is bound to yield obedience to such demand, I am at loss 
to understand upon what principles of law or reason, of 
courtesy or justice, such a claim can be founded.193 
Harris concluded his attack on Ohio with an analogy that showed why 
race, more than slavery or economics, was at the center of the breakdown 
on American domestic international law: 
 Suppose that Ohio, still further afflicted with her 
peculiar philanthropy, should determine to descend 
another grade in the scale of her peculiar humanity, and 
claim to confer citizenship on the chimpanzee or the 
ourang-outang (the most respectable of the monkey 
tribe), are we to be told that “comity” will require of the 
States not thus demented, to forget their own policy and 
self-respect, and lower their own citizens and 
institutions in the scale of being, to meet the necessities 
of the mongrel race thus attempted to be introduced into 
the family of sisters in this confederacy?194 
Justice Alexander Handy dissented from this opinion, and argued 
that as long as Nancy Wells never returned to Mississippi, she could 
inherit her legacy as a free person in Ohio.  Handy was not, however, 
“soft” on black rights.  He declared that “negro emancipation” anywhere 
was “an evil,”195 but he was willing to recognize that Ohio had the right 
to subject itself to this “evil,” and thus confer the status of a free person 
on anyone.  He would grant comity to Ohio, not because he liked what 
Ohio did, but rather out of “respect to the nation of which the person, 
whose individual right is involved, is a member.”196  To do otherwise, 
would degrade the jurisprudence of Mississippi.  If Ohio persisted in 
opposing the enforcement of the fugitive slave laws and in other 
antislavery policies, Handy had an alternative to the denial of comity: 
 Whilst the confederacy continues, we cannot justify 
ourselves as a State in violating its spirit and principles, 
because other States have, in some respects, been false to 
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their duties and obligations.  It may justify us in 
dissolving the compact, but not in violating our 
obligations under it whilst it continues.197 
In Handy’s view, secession, not a denial of comity, was the proper 
answer to Ohio’s “negro-mania.”  Within two years Mississippi would 
take that route.  When foreign nations cannot get along, within the 
context of international law, the resort is often to war.  The war that 
followed Mississippi’s secession indicates how profoundly antebellum 
American domestic international law was very much like the 
international law that existed between separate nations. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
The Civil War and the Constitutional Amendments that followed it 
fundamentally reordered American federalism.  The process served to 
finally settle certain issues in favor of racial fairness.  Settlement, 
however, did not take root quickly.  More than a century after the Civil 
War ended, notions of race and denials of comity still affected interstate 
movement of citizens. 
From the end of Reconstruction until the middle third of the 
twentieth century, the problem of interracial marriage affected American 
domestic international law and the application of fundamental notions of 
human rights to American society.  It was a problem deeply connected to 
the social construction of race and the politics of racial intolerance.  For 
the South, interracial marriage raised a problem similar to that of slavery 
in the North.  Northerners found slavery immoral, beyond the pale of 
legal protection, and a direct threat to their free society.  Similarly, many 
southern whites in the period between 1870 to 1960 found interracial 
marriage equally repugnant and dangerous to the well-being of their 
segregated society.198  Before Loving v. Virginia199 in 1967, the interstate 
recognition of interracial marriages was an issue of domestic conflicts-of-
law.200  The state prosecuted Richard and Mildred Loving because the 
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state of Virginia refused to recognize their marriage, which had legally 
been performed in another jurisdiction, Washington, D.C.  Virginia 
based its refusal on race.  The Lovings were not the first to be prosecuted 
in Virginia for this race-based crime.  In 1878, in Kinney v. 
Commonwealth,201 the Virginia Court of Appeals upheld the conviction of 
Andrew Kinney, an African-American, for “lewdly associating and 
cohabitating”202 with Mahala Miller, a white woman he had married in 
Washington, D.C.  Virginia did not limit its obsession with race, and 
racial “purity” to African-Americans.  Similarly, in 1955 in Naim v. 
Naim,203 Virginia’s highest court ruled that a marriage between a man of 
Chinese ancestry who married a white woman in North Carolina was 
illegal in Virginia.204  In 1962, the same court denied a divorce to a white 
woman who married a Filipino in New Jersey.205  The Virginia court held 
the marriage was invalid in the first place and, thus, no divorce was 
possible. 
All of these cases illustrate the problem of domestic international law 
and the U.S. Constitution’s requirement that the states give “Full Faith 
and Credit” to the “public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of 
every other State.”206  Because all of these marriages were valid in the 
jurisdictions in which they were performed, Virginia’s laws appear to 
have violated both the letter and spirit of the Constitution.207  These 
issues are of course also tied to human rights.  In Loving, the Court 
accepted the idea that marriage is a fundamental right.  It is also a 
fundamental human right.  Even without knowing it, the Loving Court 
was applying concepts of basic human rights through the equal 
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  In Lawrence v. Texas208 
the Court held the government may not “demean” the “existence or 
control” the “destiny” of gay couples by “making their private sexual 
conduct a crime.”209  This certainly speaks to issues of “human rights” in 
our domestic law.  In the aftermath of Loving and the Civil Rights 
Revolution of the 1960s, the relationship between race and American 
domestic international law has been less important, but it has hardly 
disappeared.  On the other hand, issues of gender, sexuality, and 
                                                 
201 71 Va. (30 Gratt.) 858 (1878). 
202 Id. at 858–59. 
203 87 S.E.2d 749 (Va. 1955). 
204 Wallenstein, Boundaries, supra note 200, at 573.  
205 Calma v. Calma, 128 S.E.2d 440 (Va. 1962). 
206 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. 
207 Under this theory the “Defense of Marriage Act,” is also unconstitutional.  See supra 
note 45 discussing the “Defense of Marriage Act.” 
208 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
209 Id. at 578. 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 44, No. 3 [2010], Art. 2
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol44/iss3/2
2010] Domestic Problem 823 
marriage are remaking our international domestic law.  Nevertheless, 
new connections between race and human rights emerge.  The most 
recent Supreme Court case involving interstate movement focused on 
the rights of new migrants to receive public assistance.210  The Supreme 
Court struck down a California welfare regulation, requiring differential 
payments for people who recently moved into the state.  Part of the 
rationale for this decision was the concept, now deeply ingrained in 
American law, that, at a minimum, the Privileges and Immunities Clause 
of the United States Constitution guarantees the right of people to travel 
and move from state to state.  This makes good sense, since the framers 
of the 14th Amendment had seen the pernicious influence of the black 
seamen’s laws on interstate relations and the rights of both black and 
white Americans.  Perhaps this is a signal that American constitutional 
law, domestic international law, and human rights law will move away 
from using race as a criterion for determining status.  However, as long 
as police departments continue to use a combination of race and out-of-
state license plates in the profile stops,211 we can only wonder if 
America’s third full century will be able to shed the legacy of the first 
two.  Similarly, race is clearly a factor in sentencing and convictions for 
capital cases, even if the Supreme Court refuses to take notice of it.212  
Similarly immigrant status has become an issue as aliens face special 
hurdles in capital cases.213  Recent legislation in Arizona authorizing the 
police to stop people who “look like” illegal aliens will only raise the 
potential for harassment and denial of basic rights, due to racial 
stereotyping.214  Thus, it seems likely that issues of international human 
rights, race, American domestic law, and America’s domestic 
international law will continue for the foreseeable future. 
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